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Accounting standard setters have increasingly attempted to align external segment reporting 
disclosures to a firm’s internal reporting structure. We study how this move to the 
management approach for segment reporting impacted the number of reported segments and 
the extent of line item disclosures when Australia adopted IAS 14 (revised) and IFRS 8. We 
find that both standards led to firms disclosing a greater number of segments. An examination 
of the motives behind the non-disclosure of segments suggests that segment information was 
withheld for agency cost reasons. We find only limited support for the proprietary cost 
motive for non-reporting of segments. We also document that IFRS 8 led to a reduction in the 
amount of line item disclosure. Consistent with a proprietary cost explanation, the decrease in 
disclosure is greatest for firms with a higher number of profitable segments. Our results 
indicate that the change to the management approach to segment identification is not 
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Segment reporting is the disaggregation of a reporting entity’s financial reports into 
segments. Users of financial statements such as analysts claim that segment information is 
essential in assessing and predicting firm performance (Knutson, 1993). Managers, however, 
have incentives to report fewer segments externally than are actually present within a firm to 
conceal industry diversity (Berger and Ofek, 1995) and to minimise proprietary (Hayes and 




In response to criticisms that firms were aggregating segments for external reporting 
purposes, standard setters have moved towards requiring firms to disclose segments in 
accordance with their internal reporting structure (i.e., the management approach). For 
example, in 1998 the FASB introduced SFAS 131 “Disclosures about Segments of an 
Enterprise and Related Information” which requires externally reported segments to be 
defined consistently with the internal reporting structure of the business. At the international 
level, these changes in reporting were implemented partially in the change from IAS 14 
“Segment Reporting” to the revised IAS 14 “Segment Reporting,”
2
 and then further in the 
change from IAS 14R to IFRS 8 “Operating Segments.”
3
 
This study has a number of objectives. First, we determine whether the adoption of both IAS1 
4R and IFRS 8 resulted in an increase in the number of segments reported externally. Second, 
we provide evidence on the incentives that explain which firms revealed additional segments 
upon the adoption of both standards. Third, we take advantage of the discretion in segment 
line item disclosure provided in IFRS 8 to analyse potential motives for firms which reported 
less disclosure. Finally, we examine whether the adoption of both IAS14R and IFRS 8 
improved the properties of analyst forecasts. 
There are three motivations for this study. First, US evidence subsequent to the introduction 
of SFAS 131 indicates that the standard was successful in increasing the number of reported 
segments (Street et al. 2000 and Berger and Hann, 2003). However, studies which examine 
the reasons for the non-disclosure of segments prior to SFAS 131 have provided mixed 
results. For example, Botosan and Stanford (2005) find that the newly revealed segments 
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 The contention that managers can manipulate the definition of segments to minimise segment disclosures has 
been an issue recognised in prior studies over a long period of time. For instance, see Emmanuel and Gray  
(1977) who discuss issues related to the initial release of SFAS No. 14 “Financial Reporting for Segments of a 
Business Enterprise” in 1976. 
2
 For ease of exposition, we hereafter refer to IAS 14 (revised) as IAS 14R. 
3
 A detailed discussion of the regulatory background is provided in Section 2 of the paper. 
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under SFAS 131 were operating in less competitive industries, which is consistent with a 
proprietary cost explanation for the non-disclosure of segments. In contrast, Berger and Hann 
(2003 and 2007) report that newly disclosed segments were underperforming consistent with 
an agency explanation for segment non-disclosure. Given these contrasting results, Berger 
and Hann (2007) recommend that further evidence on the incentives of firms to aggregate 
segments be obtained from non-US studies. This study contributes such evidence by 
examining Australia’s adoption of two separate accounting standards which were intended to 




The second motivation for this study is to provide a comprehensive examination of the 
impact on firm reporting of international standard setters moving their segment accounting 
standards towards a management approach. Prior studies document that the adoption of both 
IAS 14R (Street and Nichols, 2002) and IFRS 8 (Crawford et al., 2012 and Nichols et al., 
2012) led to firms reporting additional segments. Previous research also indicates that IFRS 8 
resulted in less segment line item disclosure (Crawford et al., 2012 and Nichols et al., 2012). 
These studies however, typically examine only a small sample of the largest listed firms. In 
contrast, we use a sample of all Australian listed firms with available data to analyse the 
impact of both standards. 
A further limitation with prior research examining the effect of IAS 14R and IFRS 8 is that 
these studies are typically descriptive and do not attempt to analyse possible motives for the 
reporting of additional segments or a reduction in line item disclosure upon the adoption of 
IFRS 8. This study however, attempts to provide evidence on why firms reported additional 
segments or reduced line item disclosures. In an ideal, full-disclosure world, management 
would report externally segments and segment information consistent with the internal 
reporting structure of the firm.
5
 However, in the real world, firms likely report their segment 
information in an optimal fashion which reflects a cost-benefit trade-off. As a result, firms for 
which the perceived costs exceed the benefits report more aggregated segments and less 
segment information.
6
 Based on prior research we argue that these trade-offs are driven – at 
                                                          
4
 By focussing on a single country (Australia) with an almost simultaneous adoption of IAS 14R and IFRS 8, we 
avoid problems caused by varying cross-country institutional environments and cross-time economic conditions.  
5
 This assumes firms arrange their internal reporting structure in a manner which provides management with the 
most optimal information for decision making. 
6
 A maintained assumption of our study is that firms were previously under-reporting the number of segments. 
Prior studies, (Piotroski, 1999, 2003) attempt to measure the extent of segment under-reporting using SIC codes. 
However, historical SIC codes at the firm level are not available for Australian firms from the Thomson Reuters 
Datatream database and as a result we are unable to conduct a similar analysis. In the additional analysis section 
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the margin – by agency and proprietary considerations and an incentive to report less 
industrial diversity. Accordingly, we expect that a change in accounting standards towards a 
more strict regulation of the segment identification process leads to, on average, the 
disclosure of a greater number of segments.
7
 We also expect that, when accounting standards 
provide discretion as to the line items which need to be disclosed that some firms choose to 
reduce disclosure. Furthermore, we expect the change in the number of reported segments 




The final motivation for this study is to provide evidence on whether the move internationally 
to the management approach for segment reporting resulted in an improved information 
environment for users. This research question has largely been unexamined in prior studies 
assessing the impact of IAS 14R and IFRS 8. We address this gap in the literature by 
analysing whether the adoption of either standard improved the properties of analyst 
forecasts. This investigation also adds to prior US research (Berger and Hann, 2003 and 
Botosan and Stanford, 2005) which finds inconsistent evidence on whether the adoption of 
SFAS 131 improved analyst forecast accuracy. 
Our evidence is based on a sample of 1,241 Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) listed 
firms which adopted IAS 14R in 2002 and 1,617 ASX listed firms which adopted IFRS 8 in 
2009.
9
 We conduct our investigation by taking advantage of the availability of reporting on 
the same year of information using respectively the newly adopted and prior standard. IAS 
14R required firms to choose either business or geographical segments for their primary 
segment reporting format. This choice was based on the dominant source and nature of an 
entity’s “risks and returns.” The standard indicated that the basis for determining the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
of the paper (section 5.5), we make use of the narrative disclosures for a subsample of firms in an attempt to 
assess segment under-reporting. 
7
 This expectation assumes that external auditors are able to access internal firm documents to ensure 
compliance. Informal discussions with a small number of auditors, suggests that they are able to obtain internal 
documents for auditing purposes. We leave it to subsequent research to examine this issue further. 
8
 Arguably, reporting segment information externally consistent with the internal reporting structure of the 
business should reduce the workload of auditors in verifying the disclosures. We leave it to subsequent research 
to examine the possible implications of the change in segment reporting for auditors (e.g., audit fees). 
9
 IAS 14R was adopted in Australia in 2002 as a revised version of AASB 1005 “Segment Reporting.” This 
revised standard was adopted as part of the Australian Accounting Standards Board’s (AASB) international 
accounting standard convergence project and is equivalent to IAS 14R issued by the International Accounting 
Standards Committee in 1997. In 2004, as part of Australia’s move from international accounting standard 
harmonisation to adoption, the revised AASB 1005 was replaced by AASB 114 “Segment Reporting”, for 
financial years ending on or after 1 January 2005. As AASB 114 was a direct copy of IAS 14R, it was 
equivalent to both that standard and to the revised version of AASB 1005. In 2009, IFRS 8 replaced AASB 114 
in Australia under the title AASB 8 “Operating Segments.” For ease of reference, we refer to standards in the 
text using their international prefix and numbering. 
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dominant source of an entity’s “risk and returns” should be a firm’s internal organisational 
and management structure and the system of internal reporting to the board of directors and 
CEO (para 4.2.1). As such, the standard intended that firms would externally report their 
segments on the same basis as reported internally within the firm. Subsequent to its release, 
IAS 14R was criticised due to the flexibility introduced by the “risks and returns” 
qualification contained in the accounting standard. This qualification potentially allowed 
managers to report segments externally in an inconsistent manner with the internal reporting 
structure of the business on the basis that the internal reporting structure did not reflect the 
nature and source of the business’ “risks and returns.”  
These criticisms were addressed by the IASB in 2009 through the implementation of IFRS 8 
which amended the operating segment definition to “components of the business whose 
results are regularly reviewed by the chief operating decision maker.” Unlike the prior 
standard, IFRS 8 does not include a “risks and returns” qualification to the disclosure of 
segments, thus limiting management discretion in restructuring segment information for 
external reporting purposes. IFRS 8 however reduced the number of mandatory line item 
disclosures for reported segments. 
We find that the adoption of both IAS 14R and IFRS 8 resulted in an increase in the number 
of reported segments. For instance, 16%/(19%) of firms which reported only a single-
segment prior to IFRS 8/(IAS 14R) disclosed multiple-segments after the change in 
accounting rules. Furthermore, 19%/(14%) of multiple-segment firms reported additional 
segments under IFRS 8/(IAS 14R). Our findings for the Australian setting are largely 
consistent with the consequences of the management approach reported in the US (e.g., Street 
et al., 2000, Berger and Hann, 2003 and Botosan and Stanford, 2005) as well as those 
documented internationally (Crawford et al., 2012; Nichols et al., 2012; Kang and Gray, 
2013). However, as our sample comprises all listed Australian firms our results are more 
comprehensive than prior international evidence assessing the impact of adopting the 
management approach. 
We use a multivariate approach to try to distinguish between the alternative explanations for 
why firms reveal additional segments. This approach allows us to control for other reasons, 
identified from prior studies (McKinnon and Dalimunthe, 1993; Mitchell et al., 1995 and 
Aitken et al., 1997), which may influence the voluntary supply of segment information. 
Consistent with an agency explanation, our multivariate analysis indicates that the increase in 
the number of reported segments upon Australia’s adoption of IFRS 8 is positively related to 
the number of segments reporting a loss. Interestingly, the adoption of IAS 14R provides the 
6 
 
opposite result, with those firms disclosing a greater number of segments having fewer loss 
making segments. This finding is suggestive of firms using the “risks and returns” 
qualification in IAS 14R to not report loss making segments. Inconsistent with a proprietary 
cost explanation for the non-reporting of segments, we find that following the adoption of 
both accounting standards, a firm’s concentration ratio is generally insignificant in explaining 
the increase in the number of reported segments. We do find, however, that firms revealing 
additional segments are significantly larger providing some support for the proprietary cost 
explanation. After the adoption of both IAS 14R and IFRS 8, the number of unique industries 
in which a firm operates is also significantly related to a firm revealing additional segments. 
This result is consistent with firms being eager to avoid their share price being traded at a 
diversification discount (Berger and Ofek, 1995). 
We also examine whether firms took advantage of the discretion available in IFRS 8 to 
disclose less line item information about reported segments. For this analysis we focus on 
multiple-segment firms having no-change in the number of segments reported upon the 
implementation of IFRS 8. We focus on this group of no-change firms because for these 
firms there would be no additional costs of collecting the line item information, as their 
reporting systems had previously been designed to collect such information. Any reduction in 
disclosure thus represents a choice by management to provide less line item information for 
reported segments. Our investigation indicates that, after the adoption of IFRS 8, multiple-
segment no-change firms disclosed less line item information, with the greatest decrease in 
disclosure occurring for capital expenditure. Similar results are reported in Crawford et al. 
(2012) and Nichols et al. (2012). Further analysis of the reduction in line item disclosures 
shows that firms decreasing line item information had significantly less loss making segments 
and operated in more concentrated industries. These findings are consistent with firms 
reducing line item disclosures due to proprietary cost reasons. 
Using the properties of analyst cash flow and earnings forecasts, we investigate whether the 
adoption of both standards improved the information environment for company analysts. 
Unlike US evidence for SFAS 131 (Berger and Hann, 2003 and Botosan and Stanford, 2005), 
but similar to the findings in Leung and Verriest (2014), we find no significant change in 
analyst forecast accuracy or dispersion following the adoption of either standard. Our 
evidence suggest that information about the newly revealed segments was available to 
analysts through other sources or alternatively, it may be driven by a loss of sample size due 
to a lack of analyst coverage in our refined sample. 
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This paper makes a number of contributions. Firstly, prior research examining the effects of 
the adoption of IAS 14R and IFRS 8 are typically based on a small sample of large listed 
firms and do not examine the motivations behind the prior non-disclosure of segments. In 
contrast, our study uses the entire population of Australian firms and empirically investigates 
the motivation for the change in quantity and quality of segment information using a wide 
range of tests. Secondly, there is limited prior evidence on the effects of the adoption of IAS 
14R on the number of disclosed segments. As IAS 14R represented one of the initial attempts 
of standard setters outside the US to align internal and external segment reporting, it is 
important to have large sample evidence on the effects of the adoption of this standard. This 
study provides such evidence. Furthermore, having evidence on the impact of IAS 14R is 
particularly important, as this initial move to using the management approach for segment 
reporting possibly explains why IFRS 8 did not lead to more significant changes in segment 
disclosures. Thirdly, similar to a number of studies we document a reduction in line item 
disclosures after the implementation of IFRS 8. We, however, extend this prior literature by 
examining whether the reduction in disclosures is driven by proprietary or agency cost 
explanations. Finally, we add to the growing body of literature which examines the 
consequences of the adoption of IFRS 8 (Blanco et al., 2014 and Leung and Verriest, 2014). 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: in section two we explain the regulatory 
background before moving onto discussing previous segment disclosure research and our 
hypotheses in section three. Section four discusses our method and sample selection, whilst 
section five presents our results. The final section of the paper provides a conclusion and 
suggestions for future research. 
2. Regulatory background 
IAS 14R “Segment Reporting” was applicable in Australia for years beginning on or after 1 
July 2001, with early adoption permitted. The new standard adopted a primary reporting 
format for segment information (i.e., either business or geographic segments) based on the 
predominant source and nature of an entity’s “risks and returns.”
10
 According to the standard, 
an entity’s organisational and management structure, as well as its internal financial reporting 
system to the CEO, normally provides the best evidence of whether the entity’s predominant 
“risks and returns” relate to the product or services it provides or to the fact the entity 
operates in different geographical areas. As such, an entity should normally report segment 
                                                          
10
 The previous standard provided less guidance on how to identify segments (Birt et al., 2007) other than 
stating that industry segments should be based on the diversity of industry involvement of the company. It did 
not recommend that this segment identification process follow the internal reporting structure of the firm. 
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information in its financial reports on the same basis as it reports internally to top 
management. IAS 14R also expanded the range of mandatory disclosures required for 
primary segments to include, among other items, segment liabilities and segment capital 
expenditures. 
IFRS 8 “Operating Segments” replaced IAS 14R for financial years commencing on or after 
January 1, 2009.
11
 IFRS 8 introduced two broad forms of change in comparison to IAS 14R. 
Firstly, primary and secondary segments are no longer determined using potential or actual 
“risks and returns.” Instead, segments reported for external reporting purposes needed to be 
consistent with the information provided to a firm’s chief operating decision maker (CODM). 
This change reduced the flexibility of managers to restructure their internal segments when 
reporting externally. Under the prior standard such a restructuring may have been justified by 
arguing that the internal reporting system did not reflect potential or actual “risks and 
returns.”
12
 IFRS 8 (para. 12) refers to a criterion of “similar economic characteristics” for 
segment aggregation, thus implying an additional barrier to segment aggregation (i.e., non-
disclosure). 
The second main change in IFRS 8 is a reduction in the number of mandated segment 
disclosures. IFRS 8 mandates disclosure only of profit/loss and assets of each reportable 
segment, whereas IAS 14R required, in addition, segment revenue, liabilities, depreciation 
and capital expenditure.
13
 IFRS 8 requires disclosure of segment revenue, liabilities, 
depreciation and capital expenditure only if the CODM is provided with this information 
(para. 23). Furthermore, segment information no longer needs to be measured using the 
accounting policies applied for external reporting, but may be reported in the same way as 
disclosed by the internal reporting system. Figure 1 presents a summary of the key disclosure 
differences between IAS 14R and IFRS 8. 
British segment reporting has (loosely) followed a similar development trajectory. Segment 
reporting was initially required by the Companies Act, 1967. However, Emmanuel and 
Garrod (1987) document criticism of the level of subjectivity allowed under the Act in 
                                                          
11
 AASB 114 was issued in 2004 as part of the AASBs convergence process to international accounting 
standards. As AASB 114 was equivalent to IAS 14R, we refer to IFRS 8 replacing IAS 14R in the text to 
simplify the discussion. 
12
 Firms may still possibly withhold segment information under IFRS 8 by restructuring their internal reporting. 
Such an approach seems counterproductive, however, as it suggests managers would be receiving suboptimal 
information to make business decisions. An additional method of concealing segments under IFRS 8 is by 
manipulating the definition of the CODM so that the information disclosed under the standard is highly 
aggregated (Crawford et al., 2012). 
13
 IFRS 8 was amended from 2011 onwards to mandate disclosure only of a measure of segment profitability. 
The reporting of segment assets is now required only if also provided to the CODM. 
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relation to the segment identification process; the Act merely required identification of 
segments from substantially different industry or geographic sectors, without defining 
“substantially different.” In 1990, this issue was partially addressed by the Accounting 
Standards Board’s issuance of SSAP 25 “Segmental Reporting”, which was equivalent to IAS 
14 at the time of issue (1990). UK listed companies were subject to IFRS standards from 
2005. Unlisted companies, however, continued to use SSAP 25 until the Financial Reporting 
Council’s promulgation of FRS 102 “The Financial Reporting Standard applicable in the UK 
and the Republic of Ireland” in 2014 required them to apply IFRS 8 in relation to segment 
reporting. 
3. Background literature and hypotheses 
Influence of moving to the management approach on the number of reported segments 
The consequence of adopting the management approach on the number of reported segments 
has been examined in both the US and elsewhere. The findings in these studies are consistent 
with the move to the management approach resulting in the disclosure of additional segments. 
For instance, a number of studies document an increase in the number of segments disclosed 
subsequent to the implementation of SFAS 131 in the US (Street et al., 2000, Berger and 
Hann, 2003, Botosan and Stanford, 2005). 
Street and Nichols (2002) investigate the effect of the adoption of IAS 14R and find a 
significant decrease in the number of firms reporting only a single-segment and an increase in 
the amount of information disclosed. They however, find no significant difference in the 
number of reported segments. The impact of the adoption of IAS 14R within the Australian 
banking sector is investigated by Birt et al. (2007). They show that the standard led to an 
increase in both the reported number of segments and the number of line items disclosed.  
The impact of the adoption of IFRS 8 on the number of reported segments has been examined 
in a number of studies using samples restricted to the largest listed firms. For example, 
Crawford et al. (2012) examine the impact of IFRS 8 in the UK using a sample of 150 
companies and report an increase in the average number of segments disclosed. Kang and 
Gray (2013) investigate how IFRS 8 changed the reporting of the top 200 Australian firms. 
They show a significant increase in the average number of reported segments, although 45% 
of firms experienced no change. They also examine how firms delineate the CODM and 
indicate that 57% of firms state that the CODM is either the management team or the CEO. 
The effect of IFRS 8 on 335 large European companies is studied in Nichols et al. (2012). 
Similar to Crawford et al. (2012) and Kang and Gray (2013) they find a significant increase 
10 
 
in the reported number of segments post- IFRS 8 and a decline in the number of firms 
reporting as a single-segment firm.
14
 
The evidence summarised above, indicates that the move by standard setters to having firms 
report external segment information according to the internal reporting structure of the 
business results in the disclosure of additional segments. These findings are consistent with 
some firms previously not reporting externally according to their internal reporting structure. 
In this study, we examine the impact of IAS 14R and IFRS 8 on the number of reported 
segments using all Australian listed firms with available data. This data set provides a more 
comprehensive sample of firms than that used in prior research. As a result, we are able to 
provide more conclusive evidence on the impact of these two standards on the number of 
reported segments. Given the findings of prior studies, our first hypothesis predicts that 
Australia’s adoption of both IAS 14R and IFRS 8 led to the disclosure of additional 
segments: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The number of reported segments increases after the adoption of IAS 14R 
and IFRS 8 
 
Incentives for the non-disclosure of segments 
Beyond documenting that the move to the management approach resulted in the reporting of 
additional segments, prior research has turned to studying the incentives for the non-
disclosure of segments. It is likely that managers withhold segment information when they 
perceive the costs of disclosure to exceed the benefits. The incentives for under-reporting 
which have received prominence in prior studies relate to not disclosing industry diversity 
and minimising agency and proprietary costs. The reason for obscuring firm industrial 
diversity follows from prior research which documents that diversified firms trade at a share 
price discount (Lang and Stulz, 1994 and Berger and Ofek, 1995).
15
 A firm will conceal a 
segment for agency reasons if a segment is underperforming and the revelation of the 
segment would highlight monitoring deficiencies within the organisation. In contrast, the 
proprietary cost rationale for non-disclosure is that firms conceal segments in non-
competitive industries since disclosure may encourage additional competition and lower the 
firm’s ability to generate abnormal profits. 
                                                          
14
 Nichols et al., (2013) provide a comprehensive review of studies which examine the move to the management 
approach for segment reporting under SFAS 131 and IFRS 8. 
15
 Recent studies question whether a diversification discount exists. See for example: Campa and Kedia, (2002), 
Villalonga (2004), Mansi and Reeb, (2004) and Ammann, et al., (2012). 
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A number of studies examine the reasons for firms’ opposition to the use of the management 
approach for segment reporting by investigating constituent lobbying on the exposure drafts 
which preceded the standards. Ettredge et al. (2002) for example, study lobbying prior to the 
implementation of SFAS 131. Their results indicate that firms opposing the standard did so 
due to proprietary costs. More specifically, they find that opposition to the standard was 
significantly higher for: larger firms, complex firms, firms with fewer customers and firms 
operating in more concentrated industries. Firm industrial diversity measured by the number 
of SIC codes in which a firm operates was unrelated to a firm’s lobbying position. Katselas et 
al. (2011) study the characteristics of firms which lobbied the IASB against the adoption of 
the exposure draft which preceded IFRS 8. Their results indicate that firms expressing 
opposition to the exposure draft were significantly smaller in size and reported fewer 
segments. These findings are consistent with firms opposing the proposed standard if it was 
more likely to lead to an increase in the number of reported segments. 
Previous research has also studied the reasons for the non-disclosure of segments by 
analysing the newly revealed segments after the implementation of SFAS 131. For example, 
Berger and Hann (2003) compare restated disclosures under SFAS 131 to the original SFAS 
14 disclosures. Univariate statistics indicate that segments disclosed under SFAS 131 are 
more numerous and diversified than under the superseded SFAS 14. In addition, newly 
reported segments were more likely to be poor performers (indicated by the incidences of 
loss-making segments and cross-segment resource transfers in the SFAS 131 disclosures). 
They also find that single-segment firms that subsequently disclose multiple-segments under 
SFAS 131 experience an increase in the diversification discount. 
Botosan and Stanford (2005) examine firms that went from being single-segment firms pre- 
SFAS 131 to being multiple-segment firms post- SFAS 131. Consistent with newly revealed 
segments operating in less competitive industries, they find that the median (but not the 
mean) concentration ratio of segments not disclosed in pre-SFAS 131 reports is higher than 
the concentration ratio of the firm’s primary industry. A comparison of profitability, 
however, indicates that firms which revealed additional segments were no different to single-
segment firms which had no-change in the number of reported segments. 
Berger and Hann (2007) provide an examination of whether the appearance of newly reported 
segments under SFAS 14 is consistent with agency or proprietary cost reasons and find 
greater support for the agency explanation for the non-disclosure of segments. They are also 
critical of the results of Botosan and Stanford (2005), arguing that the mean differences 
documented in that study are actually insignificant. Moreover, they argue that Botosan and 
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Stanford (2005) should have compared single-segment firms which reported additional 
segments upon adoption of SFAS 131 with multiple-segment firms having no-change in the 
number of reported segments. If the new standard reveals ‘hidden’ segments, then change 
firms have always been multiple-segment firms but have merely chosen not to disclose that 
fact. The appropriate comparison group is, therefore, multiple-segment firms which disclosed 
their multiple segments. We take this criticism into account when conducting our analysis. 
In contrast to other studies examining the impact of SFAS 131, Ettredge et al. (2006) 
examine firms which were already disclosing multiple-segments prior to the introduction of 
the standard. Also, rather than focus on newly disclosed segments they test the extent of 
variability in reported segment profitability pre- and post- SFAS 131. If firms are motivated 
to make themselves appear low-risk, then the flexibility in segment disclosure may be used to 
minimise inter-segment profit variability. They confirm that relative to SFAS 14, SFAS 131 
disclosures show higher cross-segment variability of segment profits, a higher association 
between reported profits and inherent cross-segment variability, and a higher association 
between cross-segment variability of reported profits and reliance on external financing. They 
also report a negative association between cross-segment variability and variables proxying 
for proprietary costs (i.e., concentration ratio and abnormal profit), suggesting that managers 
still use accounting flexibility to limit the disclosure of potentially harmful information. 
Wang et al. (2011) also focus on multiple-segment firms and examine incentives for the 
under-reporting of differences in segment earnings growth. They find that firms with higher 
proprietary and agency costs disclose less segment earnings growth variability. They also 
show that, after the adoption of SFAS 131, there was increased disclosure of differences in 
segment earnings growth consistent with the standard improving reporting quality. 
To date, the evidence on the incentives for the non-disclosure of segments prior to the 
adoption of the management approach is limited to studies examining the adoption of SFAS 
131 in the US. Although there is a number of prior studies which examine the impact of the 
adoption of IFRS 8, these studies are typically limited to providing descriptive evidence for a 
sample of large listed companies. Unlike the present study they do not examine possible 
motivations for the non-reporting of segments. As such, this study addresses the call for 
additional non-US research on the explanations for the non-disclosure of segments (Berger 
and Hann, 2007). 
Our hypotheses build on the incentives for the non-reporting of segments studied in prior US 
research. Whilst both IAS 14R and IFRS 8 intended to move firms towards more transparent 
disclosure consistent with their internal reporting structure, IAS 14R provided some 
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discretion to managers to not report using their internal reporting structure by applying the 
“risks and returns” qualification. Therefore, whilst the next three hypotheses provide 
predictions regarding the newly revealed segments, the discretion provided in IAS 14R 
suggests that any effect may be strongest after the implementation of IFRS 8. 
Prior evidence finds that single-segment firms which revealed additional segments 
experienced an increase in the diversification discount (Berger and Hann, 2003). If the costs 
associated with a diversification discount are substantial, managers have an incentive to 
aggregate segments when the firm operates across diverse activities. We therefore predict: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The increase in the number of segments disclosed after IAS 14R and IFRS 
8 is positively related to firm industrial diversity. 
 
Managers frequently contend that the disclosure of segment information may result in 
‘competitive harm’ to the firm. Ettredge et al. (2002) and Botosan and Stanford (2005) find 
that greater industry concentration is associated respectively with lobbying against SFAS 131 
and the reporting of additional segments following the implementation of SFAS 131. These 
findings indicate that firms have a preference for not disclosing segments in non-competitive 
industries, as revealing such information has the potential to erode the abnormal profits 
sourced from these segments. Therefore, firms operating in concentrated industries would 
have been more likely to have restructured their segments for external reporting purposes. For 
such firms, a positive change in the number of segments is expected when they report 
consistently for external and internal reporting purposes. This leads to our third hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The increase in the number of segments disclosed after IAS 14R and IFRS 
8 is positively related to the level of industry concentration.  
 
Berger and Hann (2003 and 2007) argue that managers have an incentive to not report 
segments which are underperforming, as disclosure reveals potential agency problems within 
the firm. In addition, disclosing loss making segments potentially exposes a firm to possible 
takeover threats and may provide a poor impression of firm management. Prior to the 
adoption of IAS 14R and IFRS 8, managers had greater ability to not disclose the existence of 
such losses by not reporting externally in the same manner as the internal reporting structure 
of the business. As this type of restructuring of segments was made more difficult by IAS 
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14R and then further restricted by IFRS 8, we expect an increase in the disclosure of loss-
making segments. We thus predict: 
 
Hypothesis 4: The increase in the number of segments disclosed after IAS 14R and IFRS 
8 is positively related to the number of loss making segments. 
 
Watts and Zimmerman (1978) discuss the political cost hypothesis, which posits a desire to 
suppress the salience of profit in order to minimise the chance of downward pressure on those 
profits through regulatory action. Although segment reporting has no impact on total profit, 
the identification of reportable segments can reveal highly profitable segments. If this alerts 
regulators to excess profitability, then the firm may be subject to regulatory action regarding 
the performance of that segment (e.g., through competition policy). This political cost 
motivation to withhold segment information has not been discussed in prior research. As 
regulatory intervention would be more likely to occur for segments in non-competitive 
industries, a political cost explanation for non-disclosure is subsumed in the proprietary cost 
hypothesis. In addition, as the political cost hypothesis suggests the suppression of 
information for profitable, rather than loss-making segments, it results in an opposite 
prediction to Hypothesis Four. 
 
Influence of the management approach on the quantity of line item disclosure 
As described above, IFRS 8 reduced the number of mandatory disclosures for reportable 
segments and instead only required the reporting of information that was provided to the 
CODM. At the time of this study, IFRS 8 mandated disclosure only of “profit/loss” and 
“assets” for each segment; while the previous standard required additional items to be 
disclosed, such as segment revenue, liabilities, depreciation and capital expenditure. A 
number of studies have examined the impact of this change on the quantity of line item 
disclosures. Crawford et al. (2012) indicate, using UK evidence, that after the introduction of 
IFRS 8, there was a reduction in the reporting of segment line item information, with the 
largest reduction for capital expenditure and liabilities. Nichols et al. (2012) using a sample 
of European firms also find that IFRS 8 led to a reduction in the disclosure of line items with 
the greatest decrease taking place for liabilities and capital expenditure. Kang and Gray 
(2013) using Australian data find that the extent of information disclosed (as measured by a 
count of the number of lines) increased for 45% of firms after the adoption of IFRS 8. Leung 
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and Verriest (2014) study geographical segment disclosures after IFRS 8 and document the 
reporting of less geographical segment information. 
This study extends this line of research by examining the motives for firms to decrease their 
line item disclosure. It is our contention that the extent of line-item disclosure is also subject 
to the influence of competitive forces and the desire to minimise agency costs. For firms 
already disclosing segments using their internal reporting structure under IAS 14R, the cost 
of disclosure for these additional items upon adopting IFRS 8 would be negligible. For these 
multiple-segment no-change firms, the new standard, however, allowed them to reduce the 
amount of detailed segment information disclosed. On the assumption that disclosure is 
viewed by the management of some firms as imposing proprietary and/or agency costs which 
exceed the benefits of disclosure, we hypothesise: 
 
Hypothesis 5: A decrease in disclosure after IFRS 8 for multiple-segment firms with no-
change in the number of reported segments is more likely for firms with higher agency 
and/or proprietary costs 
 
Impact of segment disclosures on the information environment 
Earlier research has used the properties of analyst forecasts to examine whether SFAS 131 
increased the extent of information available to users. Berger and Hann (2003) examine the 
accuracy of analyst forecast errors using SFAS 131 disclosures and pre-SFAS 131 
disclosures. They generate one year-ahead forecasts based on both the pre-SFAS 131 data 
and the SFAS 131 restated information. They find that the restated information is related to 
analyst forecasts in the first half of the SFAS 131 adoption year, indicating that analysts 
considered the SFAS 131 information prior to the disclosure of the information. They also 
report that analyst earnings forecast errors decreased for firms that changed the number of 
reportable segments upon adopting SFAS 131, highlighting that the revised segment data 
contained significant new information. In contrast, Botosan and Stanford (2005) find that 
SFAS 131 increased analyst forecast errors and uncertainty but improved analyst forecast 
consensus. 
Ettredge et al. (2005) analyse whether the capital market’s ability to predict future earnings 
improved after the adoption of SFAS 131. Consistent with an improvement in the information 
environment, they find a significant increase in the forward earning response coefficient 
(FERC) post- SFAS 131. This improvement in the FERC exists for single-segment firms that 
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disclosed more segments after the adoption of SFAS 131 and multiple-segment firms 
irrespective of whether they reported a larger number of segments. In contrast, there is no 
significant change in the FERC for single-segment firms which do not report additional 
segments upon the adoption of SFAS 131. 
The impact of higher quality segment disclosures on a firm’s cost of capital is investigated in 
Blanco et al. (2014). Using a proxy for a firm’s voluntary reporting of segment information 
they report a negative association between the extent of voluntary segment disclosures and 
estimates of a firm’s ex ante cost of capital. This association however is moderated for firms 
with greater competitive pressures. 
Currently there is limited evidence outside the US on whether the adoption of the 
management approach for segment reporting led to an improvement in the properties of 
analyst forecasts. In a concurrent study, Leung and Verriest (2014) find a lack of evidence 
that analyst forecast accuracy or dispersion improved for firms which provided better 
geographic segment information post- IFRS 8.
16
 We address this gap in the literature by 
studying whether the accuracy and dispersion of analyst cash flow and earnings forecasts 
improves after adopting either IAS 14R or IFRS 8. Given the contrary evidence from the US 
we do not state a formal hypothesis. 
Australian voluntary segment disclosure research 
Early Australian research on segment disclosure focuses on investigating the incentives for 
voluntary segment reporting prior to the introduction of mandated segment disclosure in 1986 
(i.e., AAS 16 “Financial Reporting by Segments”
17
). This literature is important as it 
identifies factors which motivate firms to supply segment information to meet the 
information needs of users. In consequence, these studies inform a number of variables 
included in our regression models which aim to control for demand side drivers of segment 
disclosures. 
McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993), examine voluntary segment disclosure among 65 
diversified companies in 1985. Consistent with disclosures being provided to reduce agency 
costs, they find that voluntary disclosers of segment information had higher ownership 
dispersion. Voluntary disclosers were also larger and had greater complexity as measured by 
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  They also find no change in the cost of capital or bid-ask spreads for firms with improvements in the 
reporting of geographic segment information. 
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  From the late 1980s until the early 2000s, Australia maintained two parallel sets of standards: the AAS series 
was imposed as a professional obligation by the accounting bodies, whilst the AASB standards were imposed on 
relevant entities by corporate law. In all other respects the standards were identical. AAS 16 was thus the 
parallel form of AASB 1005. 
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the number of subsidiaries. The voluntary disclosure of segment information was also related 
to the presence of minority interests in the group structure. This finding suggests that segment 
information was provided to meet the information needs of minority shareholders. They also 
report that leverage and diversification into unrelated industries are not significantly 
associated with voluntary segment reporting. 
Mitchell et al. (1995) also examine the voluntary disclosure of segment reporting in Australia 
pre- AAS 16. Their results are consistent with those in McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) 
except that the presence of minority interests is not significantly associated with segment 
disclosure. In addition, they find that voluntary disclosers have higher leverage than non-
disclosers. They attribute this result to firms providing segment information to reduce the 
agency costs of debt. 
Neither McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) nor Mitchell et al. (1995) find that firm 
diversification influences voluntary segment reporting. Aitken et al. (1997) argue that this 
insignificant finding is due to the use of a categorical variable to measure diversification. 
They utilise an alternative measure of firm diversification calculated using the correlation 
between share returns in the industries represented in a diversified firm’s segments. Their 
findings are similar to those in McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993), with the exception that 
they find firms with greater diversification are significantly more likely to voluntarily provide 
segment disclosures. 
 
4. Method and Sample 
Our analysis of the first hypothesis involves a descriptive comparison of the number of 
segments disclosed before and after the adoption of IAS 14R and IFRS 8. Hypotheses Two to 
Four consider whether the disclosure of additional segments after the adoption of IAS 14R 
and IFRS 8 is driven by diversity, industry concentration and the presence of loss-making 
segments. If agency and/or proprietary costs and industrial diversity drive segment disclosure 
strategy, then we would expect the move to IAS 14R and IFRS 8 to have resulted in the 
reporting of additional segments which are respectively loss-making, in highly concentrated 
industries and operating in different industries. Our initial test of Hypotheses Two to Four 
uses logistic regression predicting changes in the number of segments disclosed. The 
independent variables capture the alternative motivations for withholding segment 
information discussed above, as well as controlling for other factors which are associated 




CHANGEUP = α + β1DIVERSITY + β2CONCEN + β3NLSEG + ∑controls +  ε 
 (1) 
 
CHANGEUP is an indicator variable which takes the value of one if there is an increase in 
the number of segments reported after the adoption of the new accounting standard. Firms are 
defined to have increased the number of segments reported by comparing the number of 
segments disclosed in the year prior to the adoption of the new standard with the comparative 
information provided in the first year the new standard is adopted. This approach is similar to 
the method used to identify newly reported segments in Berger and Hann (2003). The 
primary segment disclosures are used as the basis of comparison for both the move to and 
away from IAS 14R. 
To test Hypothesis Two we use a measure of firm industrial diversity (DIVERSITY) which is 
defined as the number of unique industries in which a firm operates. The coefficient, β1, is 
predicted to have a positive sign. Industry concentration (CONCEN) measured using a four-
firm concentration ratio is used to test Hypothesis Three. The four-firm concentration ratio 
for a firm’s primary industry is the top four firms’ sales in that industry divided by the sum of 
all the firms’ sales in that industry. It is predicted that the coefficient β2 has a positive sign. 
That is, firms operating in industries with a higher concentration (i.e. less competitive) are 
more likely to have not disclosed segments before the adoption of IAS 14R/IFRS 8, relative 
to firms that operate in industries with a lower concentration.
18
 Lastly, NLSEG is the number 
of loss making segments disclosed for the comparative year after the adoption of either IAS 
14R or IFRS 8 divided by the total number of reported segments. Hypothesis Four predicts a 
positive coefficient on β3, since loss-making segments would have been under-reported under 
the previous, more flexible, standards.  
We include a number of control variables in the regression model to capture a firm’s 
incentive to disclose accurate segment information to meet the information demand of users. 
These control variables are informed by the prior Australian voluntary segment disclosure 
research discussed above. These earlier studies suggest that segment information is provided 
voluntarily by firms with: greater ownership dispersion, higher complexity, and a larger size 
(McKinnon and Dalimunthe, 1993). Ownership dispersion is measured using the percentage 
ownership held by the top twenty shareholders (TOP20), while firm complexity is proxied 
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  For the DIVERSITY and CONCEN measures, industries are defined using two digit GICS codes. 
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using the number of subsidiaries (SUBSNUM). Firm size is calculated using the natural 
logarithm of total assets (SIZE). 
McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) find that voluntary segment information is disclosed more 
frequently when the group structure includes an outside equity interest. We control for this 
effect by including an indicator variable in the model (NCI) coded as one when there is a 
non-controlling interest in the group. Mitchell et al. (1995) find that higher leverage leads to 
greater voluntary segment disclosure, consistent with providing information to reduce the 
agency costs of debt. We include LEVERAGE in the model, constructed as the book value of 
debt divided by the book value of equity. As prior studies indicate that these control variables 
are associated with the voluntary provision of segment information, we expect the 
coefficients on these variables to be negatively related to the reporting of additional segments 
after the adoption of IFRS 8 and IAS 14R. 
The final two control variables included in model (1) are firm performance, measured by a 
firm’s return on assets (ROA), and growth prospects, proxied for using a company’s market-
to-book ratio (MTB) at financial year-end. If profitable and growth firms have higher 
incentives to not disclose profitable and growth segments, perhaps due for proprietary or 
political cost reasons, we expect that the move to the management approach for segment 
reporting results in such firms revealing additional segments. All of our control variables are 
measured for the financial year (or year-end) which is used to calculate the change in the 
number of reported segments.
19
 
The Morningstar DatAnalysis Premium database is used to identify the population of ASX 
firms as at June 2002 and 2009 for the IAS 14R and IFRS 8 adoptions respectively. We 
manually collect segment and other financial data from a firm’s first year of adoption of IFRS 
8 and IAS 14R by downloading each annual report from DatAnalysis. The retrospective 
application of each accounting standard is compared to the historical application of the prior 
standard for the same year. For firms that voluntarily adopted either standard earlier than the 
mandatory application date we obtained data for the first year of adoption.
20
 To test 
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 A potential limitation of this (and prior studies) examining the incentives for under-reporting of segments is 
that we measure our test and control variables at the same time as the adoption of the relevant accounting 
standard. As the incentives for under-reporting are unlikely to be static it may be more accurate to measure our 
variables using a time-series approach. We do not use such an approach due to a lack of machine readable data 
for all our variables and uncertainty over the appropriate time period over which to calculate an average 
measure. Our approach is also consistent with previous literature. This limitation needs to be considered when 
interpreting our findings. We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this limitation. 
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 The number of firms which adopted the standards early is 15 (1.2% of the sample) for IAS 14R and 29 (1.8% 




Hypothesis Five, a segment disclosure checklist is completed for multiple-segment firms 
under IAS 14R that had no-change in the number of segments disclosed under IFRS 8. Firms 
are excluded if they are new listings, do not have financial statements for the pre- adoption 
year, or if they report under non-Australian accounting standards. 
The CHANGEUP variable is based on a count of segments disclosed in each firm’s pre-
adoption year financial report compared with a count of segments in the restated data in the 
first adoption year. The numbers of segments is not affected by mergers, acquisitions, and 
divestitures since the lag adoption year is a pure restatement. The number of segments 
excludes segments labelled: ‘other’, ‘corporate’, ‘administration’ and the like.
21
 When 
examining the adoption of IFRS 8, multiple geographic segments were counted only as a 
single-segment since the aim of IFRS 8 was to disclose line of business or product/service 
segmentation. That is, firms that disclosed multiple geographic segments also state that they 
operate in a ‘single operating segment’. Table 1 highlights that the sample includes 1,617 
firm observations for the IFRS 8 adoption (Panel A) and 1,241 observations for the IAS 14R 
adoption (Panel B). 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Change in the number of segments 
We commence with some descriptive statistics to evaluate Hypothesis One. Table 1 shows a 
reduction in the number of single-segment firms and an increase in the number of multiple-
segment firms upon the adoption of both accounting standards. The revision of IAS 14 and 
adoption of IFRS 8 reduced the number of single-segment firms by 19% and 16% 
respectively. The reduction in the number of single-segment firms supports the hypothesis 
that the move to requiring firms to use their internal reporting structure to report segments 
externally leads to an increase in the number of segments reported. Our finding of an increase 
in the number of reported segments is consistent with prior studies (Berger and Hann 2003; 
Botosan and Stanford, 2005; Crawford et al., 2012; Nichols et al., 2012; Kang and Gray, 
2013). The data in Table 1 also indicates that (other than after the adoption of IAS 14R) the 
number of single-segment firms dominates multiple-segment firms. 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
Panels A through C of Table 2 report a comparison of the number of segments reported 
around the adoption of IFRS 8. A similar comparison for the move to IAS 14R is provided in 
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 We exclude such segments because the accounting standards focus on the disclosure of information for 
segments undertaking business activities and earning (or having the potential) to earn revenues. 
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Panels D through F.  Panel A/(D) shows that 88.6%/(74.2%) of firms have one or two 
segments under IAS 14R/(IAS 14 original), however, this decreases to 83%/(68%) under 
IFRS 8/(IAS 14R). The proportion of firms with a change in the number of segments is 
slightly larger for the move to IAS 14R. Panel B indicates that 79% of the sample report no-
change in the number of segments after the adoption of IFRS 8 compared to 77% following 
the move to IAS 14R. The greatest number of segment changes for both accounting standards 
reflects an increase of only one segment.
22
 Panels C and F highlight that the single to 
multiple-segments change groups represent the dominant category which increased the 
number of reported segments.
23
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
5.2 Motives for the non-disclosure of segments 
Table 3 reports univariate tests of firm characteristics for different groups of firms based on 
whether the number of segments increased upon the adoption of IFRS 8/IAS 14R.
24
 In Panel 
A, firms which change from single to multiple-segments are compared with firms that remain 
single-segment firms. In Panel B, firms which change from single to multiple-segments are 
compared with multiple-segment firms which do not change the number of reported 
segments. Finally, Panel C compares multiple-segment firms which increase the number of 
reported segments to multiple-segment firms with no-change in the number of segments. 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
Across all three panels of Table 3, there is no difference in industry concentration between 
firms reporting a greater number of segments and the no-change control groups after the 
adoption of either accounting standard. These results are, thus, inconsistent with the findings 
of Botosan and Stanford (2005). There is also limited support for Hypothesis Two, as the 
diversity measure is only significantly higher for firms increasing the number of reported 
segments in Panel C for the adoption of IAS 14R. Additionally, in Panel B when the single-
segment change group is compared to the multiple-segment no-change group, the direction of 
the significant finding on DIVERSITY for the IFRS 8 sample is inconsistent with our 
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 62/(81) firms report a decrease in the number of segments upon adoption of IFRS 8/(IAS 14R).  These firms 
are excluded from subsequent tables as a detailed analysis of firms reducing the number of reported segments is 
beyond the scope of this study. We do provide some preliminary analysis of these firms in the additional 
analysis section of this study (section 5.5). 
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 684 firms are included in both the IAS 14R and IFRS 8 samples. Across these firms, 17% and 22% 
respectively disclose additional segments after the adoption of IAS 14R and IFRS 8. Only 30 firms (4%) 
disclose additional segments after the adoption of both standards. 
24
 For single-segment no-change firms the calculation of industrial diversity or the proportion of loss making 
segments does not apply. In consequence for these firms these variables are coded as n/a in Panel A of Table 3. 
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predictions. The result on the number of loss segments is only consistent with predictions in 
Panel B for the IFRS 8 sample. In contrast, for the IAS 14R sample, the proportion of 
segments making a loss is actually lower for change firms for both single-segment (Panel B) 
and multiple-segment change firms (Panel C). Similarly, for the IFRS 8 sample, in Panel C 
when multiple-segment change firms are compared with multiple-segment no-change firms, 
the number of loss segments is significantly lower (mean only) for the change group. Overall, 
our univariate results do not lend support to the proprietary cost argument. Moreover we find 
only limited and mixed findings in relation to the agency cost explanation for under-
reporting. 
A number of the control variables reported in Table 3 are significantly different between the 
change firms and the comparison control groups. The findings, however, are inconsistent 
both across panels and between the changes in accounting standards. For example, the 
median market-to-book ratio is significantly higher for the change firms, particularly for the 
IFRS 8 sample in all three panels of Table 3. This indicates that firms which disclosed 
additional segments typically have higher growth prospects than firms already disclosing 
segments using their internal reporting structure. Similar to Botosan and Stanford (2005), for 
both samples the median of the single to multiple-segment change group has a higher median 
profitability than the single-segment no-change comparison group (Panel A). For the IFRS 8 
sample, the multiple-segment firms with an increase in the number of reported segments also 
had better average profitability when compared to the multiple-segment no-change 
comparison group. Similar results are found using the median for the IAS 14R sample. The 
results largely show that both single and multiple-segment change firms are larger than the 
control comparison groups when compared respectively with single-segment no-change firms 
(Panel A) and multiple-segment no-change firms (Panel C). Additionally, there is some 
support for change firms having a significantly greater number of subsidiaries (SUBSNUM) 
than no-change firms. For the IFRS 8 sample, the tests for differences in the mean show that 
the proportion of single-segment change firms with a non-controlling interest (NCI) is lower 
than both the single and multiple-segment firm no-change groups. This finding supports 
earlier Australian research which indicates greater voluntary segment disclosure when the 
firm ownership structure includes a minority interest. The results for the IAS 14R sample are 
consistent in Panel B but provide the opposite conclusion in Panel C. Other than the IFRS 8 
sample in Panel B, the average TOP20 shareholding is significantly higher for change firms 
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in both Panels A and B.
25
 The results on firm leverage provide no consistent significant 
differences between change and no-change firms. 
Table 4 presents Pearson correlation coefficients amongst the variables for both the IFRS 8 
(Panel A) and IAS 14R (Panel B) samples. Although there are a number of significant 
correlations, the levels are generally not high enough to raise concerns regarding 
multicollinearity (Pearson, 2010). Interestingly, the correlation between the proportion of loss 
making segments (NLSEG) and firm size and industrial diversity are negative for the IAS 
14R adoption and positive for the IFRS 8 adoption. As would be expected, firms with the 
presence of a non-controlling interest are: larger in size, have more subsidiaries and exhibit 
greater industrial diversity. The calculation of VIF factors after estimating our regression 
model confirms that multicollinearity is not a concern with our analysis. 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
Table 5 presents our test results for Hypotheses Two to Four using a logistic specification. 
Each of the five columns in this table represents a logistic regression explaining 
CHANGEUP. This variable is defined as one when a firm increases the number of its 
reported segments as a result of the change to either IFRS 8 (Panel A) or IAS 14R revised 
(Panel B) and is zero otherwise. Each group of change firms is compared to a reference 
group. Columns (1) and (2) compare single-segment change firms against, respectively, 
single-segment no-change firms and multiple-segment no-change firms. Column (1) is 
analogous to the Botosan and Stanford (2005) approach, where the appropriate comparison 
group for single-segment firms that changed to multiple-segment firms is the group of single-
segment firms with no-change in the number of reported segments. In contrast, column (2) 
highlights an important issue not addressed in Botosan and Stanford (2005); if the new 
standard better reflects economic reality, then single to multiple-segment change firms are 
really multiple-segment firms that did not disclose some of their segments. Looked at this 
way, the appropriate comparison group is multiple-segment firms which were unaffected by 
the two standards, that is, multiple-segment no-change firms (column 2). Overall, each of the 
standards appear to have contributed to resolving potential under-reporting issues in different 
ways. 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
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 The data presented in Table 3 shows the presence of significant outliers. The main results presented in Tables 
5, 6 and 8 were also re-estimated after winsorising the top and bottom 5% of the continuous variables.  The 
conclusions drawn from this alternative analysis are unchanged to those presented in the paper. 
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Hypothesis Two predicts that a firm is more likely to reveal additional segments if it operates 
across an increasing number of industries. The results for the adoption of both accounting 
standards lend some support to this hypothesis as the coefficient on the diversity variable is 
positive and significant in columns (3) and (4) of both Panels A and B. In contrast, when 
single-segment change firms are compared to multi-segment non-change firms (i.e., column 
2), the coefficient on diversity is negative and is significant for the IFRS 8 sample. This 
finding is possibly explained by the single-segment change firms being smaller than multiple-
segment no-change firms (see Panel B of Table 3). 
The results on the concentration variable are generally insignificant providing very little 
support for Hypothesis Three. For the IFRS 8 sample, when single-segment change firms are 
compared with single-segment no-change firms (i.e., column 1), the concentration variable is 
positive and significant indicating that firms with newly revealed segments operated in more 
concentrated industries. This finding is consistent with that reported in Botosan and Stanford 
(2005). In contrast, when single-segment change firms are compared with multiple-segment 
no-change firms (i.e., column 2), the concentration variable is insignificant for the IFRS 8 
sample. Interestingly, for the IAS 14R sample shown in Panel B, the results on the 
concentration variable provide opposite conclusions, with the variable being positive and 
significant in column (2), but insignificant in column (1). The sensitivity of the significance 
of the concentration variable to the choice of control group is consistent with concerns about 
the approach of Botosan and Stanford (2005) noted in Berger and Hann (2007). 
The findings for Hypothesis Four provide contrasting results between the adoption of IFRS 8 
and the adoption of IAS 14R. In Panel A, other than column (3), the results indicate that 
change firms after the adoption of IFRS 8 had a higher proportion of loss making segments 
consistent with expectations. However, the results in each column of Panel B indicate that 
change firms disclosed a lower frequency of loss making segments after the implementation 
of IAS 14R. These findings are suggestive of firms using the “risks and returns” qualification 
embodied in IAS 14R to reduce the disclosure of loss making segments.
26
 The removal of this 
qualification in IFRS 8, however, appears to have been associated with the disclosure of more 
loss making segments. 
The results on the control variables are not consistently significant across alternative models 
and samples presented in Table 5. The size variable is positive and significant in three/(two) 
of the IFRS 8/(IAS 14R) models suggesting that change firms are larger than their no-change 
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 A possible alternative explanation is that firms withheld details of profit making segments prior to the 
adoption of IAS 14R consistent with a proprietary or political cost explanation. 
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counterparts. A possible interpretation of this result is that larger firms presented fewer 
segments for political cost reasons. For the IFRS 8 sample, firm return on assets is significant 
and positive only in column (4). In contrast, firms with higher profitability were less likely to 
reveal new segments after the adoption of IAS 14R. These results are suggestive of more 
profitable firms using the “risk and returns” qualification in IAS 14R to not disclose segments 
perhaps due to proprietary or political cost concerns. Debt to equity (LEVERAGE) has 
explanatory power in only one of the models. Prior Australian studies indicate that firms 
voluntarily provided segment information when there are a greater number of subsidiaries or 
lower ownership concentration. Our results however report generally insignificant findings 
on both the TOP20 and SUBSNUM variables. In contrast to previous Australian research 
which documents higher voluntary disclosure of segment information in the presence of a 
minority interest, we only find a positive significant result for NCI when we compare single-
segment change firms to single-segment no-change firms for the IFRS 8 sample (column 1). 
All the other results on NCI, however, are insignificant.
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As an assessment of the economic significance of the results we calculate the marginal effects 
following each regression. We do not tabulate these results in the interest of brevity and 
restrict our discussion to those cases for which the key variables testing Hypotheses Two to 
Four report statistical significance in Table 5. The largest marginal effects arise for NLSEG. 
Using the IFRS 8 sample, in those models in which NLSEG is significant a 25% increase in 
the proportion of loss making segments increases the probability of a firm disclosing 
additional segments by 4% to 5%. For the IAS 14R sample, a similar increase in NLSEG 
lowers the probability of a firm disclosing additional segments by 8% to 18%. For firm 
industrial diversity, the disclosure of 25% more industries results in approximately a 1% to 
2% change in the probability of a firm reporting additional segments using both accounting 
standard changes.
28
 Recall that the results on CONCEN are largely insignificant in Table 5. 
For the two instances that provide a significant result in Table 5 the marginal effect of a 25% 
change in industry concentration is a 1% (IFRS 8) and 3% (IAS 14R) increase in the 
probability of a firm disclosing additional segments. 
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 We do not include industry fixed effects in the estimation of model (1) as the CONCEN variable is measured 
using the top four firms’ sales in a firm’s primary GICS industry. The inclusion of both variables simultaneously 
would result in perfect collinearity. We re-estimate model (1) after removing CONCEN and including indicator 
variables for a firm’s two-digit GICS code. The industry indicator variables are typically insignificant other than 
GICS 20 (Industrials) which is positively associated with CHANGEUP for the IAS 14R sample when comparing 
multiple segment no-change firms with multiple segment change firms. The conclusions from the results on the 
other variables remain unchanged to those presented. 
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 The direction of the change in probability varies according to the sign of the coefficients in Table 5. 
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A potential shortcoming of the results presented in Table 5 is that a firm is classified as 
increasing the number of segments irrespective of the number of segments that are newly 
disclosed after the adoption of the accounting standard. To partially address this concern, we 
estimate a multinomial regression model using three categories for the dependant variable. 
The dependent variable is coded as: one if a firm reports one additional segment, two if a firm 
reports two or more additional segments and zero otherwise. The results of this analysis are 
presented in Table 6 using the same comparison groups as used in Table 5. Panel A presents 
the results for the IFRS 8 sample and Panel B shows the results for the IAS 14R sample. 
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
The results of the multinomial regression largely support the findings of our hypotheses 
presented in Table 5. The concentration variable remains largely insignificant providing only 
minimal support for proprietary costs explaining the non-disclosure of segments before the 
adoption of either accounting standard. Furthermore, the number of loss segments continues 
to provide different findings for the two accounting standards with the results on NLSEG 
continuing to be significant in the same direction and for the same tests as shown in Table 5. 
The only exception is in column (5) of Panel A with an insignificant coefficient for firms 
which increased the number of segments by two or more. We also continue to find some 
support for industry diversity resulting in the disclosure of additional segments. The results in 
column (3), however, provide differing results between the two samples as to whether 
diversity led to a significant increase of one or more segments. The results in column (2) for 
the IAS 14R sample also now report a significant negative coefficient on the diversity 
variable for firms which disclosed one additional segment. This finding is consistent with the 
results for the IFRS 8 sample and, as discussed above, is likely explained by the larger firm 
size of the control group in this model. 
Overall, our results are consistent with the agency explanation for the non-disclosure of 
segments before the adoption of IFRS 8. This conclusion can be drawn as firms with an 
increase in the number of reported segments post- IFRS 8 have a significantly higher 
proportion of loss making segments. Interestingly, the results also suggest that after the 
adoption of IAS 14R, firms disclosed less loss making segments. This is consistent with the 
possibility that the “risks and returns” qualification allows firms to avoid identifying (as 
reportable) loss making segments. This interpretation is also consistent with an agency 
explanation. The results from the adoption of both IAS 14R and IFRS 8 provide only minimal 
support for the proprietary cost explanation for the non-disclosure of segments, as sales 
concentration is generally insignificant. This result is somewhat puzzling as many firms 
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lobbied against reform to segment reporting on the grounds that increased disclosure would 
result in competitive harm (Ettredge et al., 2002). Our findings also provide some evidence 
that the newly disclosed segments operated in a number of industries. This result provides 
partial support for Hypothesis Two that firms withhold segment information which would 
otherwise reveal the number of industries in which the firm operates. 
5.3 Change in line item disclosures under IFRS 8 
Tables 7 and 8 address Hypothesis Five. We posit that multiple-segment firms with no-
change in segments reduce segment level disclosures after the move to IFRS 8 and that this 
decrease in disclosure is explained by agency and or proprietary costs. Recall that IFRS 8 
mandates fewer segmental disclosures (see Figure 1). The descriptive statistics in Table 7 
demonstrate that disclosures have clearly reduced. Segment capital expenditure is the line 
item with the greatest reduction in disclosure. Crawford et al. (2012) and Nichols et al. (2012) 
find similar results in the UK and Europe. In contrast, only three firms discontinue the 
disclosure of segment revenue. Interestingly, 33 firms no longer present segment assets even 
though this is a requirement of the accounting standard, highlighting potential non-
compliance issues. 
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
We estimate a number of regression models to test factors which influence a reduction in line 
item disclosures. The independent variables included in is analysis are identical to those 
adopted in model (1). Table 8 presents the results from estimating the alternative models. The 
dependent variable in column (1) is a binary dummy variable coded as one if a firm no longer 
discloses any line item. In columns (2) through (6), the dependent variable is set to one if the 
firm reduces respectively each specific disclosure: asset, liabilities, revenue, capital 
expenditure or depreciation. In the final regression, the reduction in disclosure is a count of 
the number of the six previously disclosed items which are no longer provided. As the 




INSERT TABLE 8 HERE 
The variable which is consistently significant across the models presented in Table 8 is the 
number of loss-making segments, indicating that firms with a greater percentage of profitable 
segments are more likely to reduce a line item disclosure. Firms operating in more 
concentrated industries (columns 5 and 7) are also more likely to have a higher number of 
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undisclosed items and exhibit a reduction in capital expenditure disclosures. Taken together, 
these findings are consistent with the proprietary cost argument as the greatest reduction in 
disclosure occurs for firms with a higher proportion of profitable segments and those 
operating in more concentrated industries.
30
 Furthermore, smaller firms are also more likely 
to reduce disclosure (columns 1 and 6). If one accepts that smaller firms are more likely to be 
concerned about disclosing information to competitors, then this result is also consistent with 
a proprietary cost argument. 
Of the control variables included in the models, we find that firms with an outside equity 
interest are less likely to suppress disclosures (columns 6 and 7). Perhaps the presence of 
outside shareholders in the corporate group motivates more transparent disclosure to meet the 
information demand of these users. The results in column (3) indicate that segment liabilities 
are less likely to be disclosed for firms with lower ownership concentration. 
5.4 Impact on analyst forecasts 
To analyse whether the adoptions of IAS 14R and IFRS 8 improve the information set 
available to analysts, we investigate whether the adoption of the standards leads to lower 
analyst forecast errors and analyst forecast dispersion. Analysts are a useful proxy for 
economic effects because they provide explicit measures of expectations (forecast errors) and 
uncertainty therein (forecast dispersion). If adoption of a given reporting regime provides a 
reduction in forecast error or dispersion, then that reporting regime can be argued to enhance 
the prediction-usefulness of accounting reports. Evidence from the US after the adoption of 
SFAS 131 provides inconsistent results with Berger and Hann (2003) and Botosan and 
Stanford (2005) finding respectively a decrease and increase in analyst forecast errors. As 
such, there is a need for additional evidence on whether the move to the management 
approach for segment reporting increased the availability of information to analysts. 
Furthermore, examining whether IAS 14R and IFRS 8 provided analysts with new 
information is pertinent as analysts typically claim that accurate segment information is vital 
to estimating future performance (Knutson, 1993). 
We estimate the following models to test respectively the impact of the adoption of the new 
accounting standards on analyst forecast errors and analyst forecast dispersion: 
AFE = α + β1POST+ β2CHANGE + β3 POST *CHANGE + ∑controls +  ε  (2) 
AFD= α + β1POST+ β2CHANGE + β3 POST *CHANGE + ∑controls +  ε  (3) 
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Similar to Berger and Hann (2003) absolute analyst forecast errors (AFE) are calculated as 
the average forecast error for analyst forecasts issued during the 180 days following the 
previous financial year’s announcement date, deflated by share price. Analyst forecast 
dispersion (AFD) is measured as the standard deviation of all analyst forecasts issued during 
the 180 days following the previous financial year’s announcement date. Analyst forecast 
errors and dispersion are calculated for the one year immediately before and after segment 
information is released for the first time using either IFRS 8 or IAS 14R. The year after 
adoption is denoted in the regression using an indicator variable coded as one (POST). We 
also include an indicator variable in the model denoting firms which disclose a higher number 
of segments after the adoption of IFRS 8 or IAS 14R (CHANGE). An interaction variable 
between POST and CHANGE is also included in the models (POST*CHANGE). If the 
adoption of the standards releases new information to analysts, we expect that analyst 
forecast errors and dispersion is lower after the adoption of the standards, thereby providing a 
negative coefficient on POST. Furthermore, any effect on analyst forecasts would be 
expected to be greater for firms that reported additional segments after the adoption of the 
new standards, which leads us to expect a negative coefficient on β3. We estimate models (2) 
and (3) separately for analyst cash flow and earnings forecasts and in turn for the adoption of 
IAS 14R and IFRS 8. 
The following control variables are included in the models: 
SIZE:  measured as the natural logarithm of firm market capitalisation at the end of  
the financial year being forecast 
AFOLLOW: the maximum number of analysts following a firm during the 180 day window 
MTIMELY: average number of days between the analyst forecast and the announcement 
date of the number being forecast 
D_LOSS: an indicator variable coded as one for observations where the earnings or cash 
flow for the forecast period is less than zero. 
These control variables are included in the models as prior studies (e.g., Lang and Lundholm, 
1993; Tan et al., 2011) show that analyst forecast properties are related to firm size, analyst 
following, forecast age and whether a firm is loss making.
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Details on analysts and earnings and cash flow forecasts are obtained from the I/B/E/S 
database. As not all firms in our two samples have analyst coverage, the sizes of the samples 
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control variable in their model. We do not include this variable as it further limits our sample size. 
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available to estimate models (2) and (3) are significantly reduced.
32
 Tables 9 and 10 present 
respectively descriptive statistics on the analyst forecast errors and analyst forecast 
dispersion. 
INSERT TABLES 9 AND 10 HERE 
The mean analyst earnings forecast error is 2.43% of the price around the IFRS 8 adoption 
and 1.56% of the price surrounding the IAS 14R adoption. The statistics in both Tables 9 and 
10 indicate that the average firm has around six or seven analysts and the average length of 
time between the forecast and the announcement of earnings for the financial year being 
forecast is about nine months. 
Table 11 provides the results of estimating regression model (2) testing whether the adoption 
of either standard improves analysts’ cash flow or earnings forecast errors. 
INSERT TABLE 11 HERE 
Although the coefficient on POST is negative in all four columns of Table 11, all four 
coefficients are insignificant differently from zero. Similarly, the interaction of POST with 
CHANGE also provides insignificant results indicating there is no change in analyst forecast 
accuracy for firms which disclose additional segments after the adoption of the respective 
accounting standards. The only variable consistently significant in Table 11 is firm size, 
which is negatively associated with analyst forecast errors. 
The findings from testing model (3), which determine whether the adoption of the two 
accounting standards reduced analyst forecast dispersion, are presented in Table 12. 
INSERT TABLE 12 HERE 
Similar to the results in Table 11, we do not find any significant effect on the standard 
deviation of analyst forecasts around the changes in either accounting standard. Additionally, 
the interaction between POST and CHANGE is once more insignificant. The results on the 
control variables indicate that analyst forecast dispersion is significantly higher around the 
adoption of IAS 14R for loss making firms. 
In additional testing, we estimate models (2) and (3) with the CHANGE variable redefined as 
a rank variable measuring the size of the increase in the number of reported segments. Using 
this alternative definition does not change the conclusions from our results. We also repeat 
the analysis in Tables 11 and 12 alternately on the following subgroups: single-segment 
change firms and single-segment no-change firms, single-segment change firms and multiple-
segment no-change firms, multiple-segment change firms and multiple-segment no-change 
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firms without analyst following. There is no significant difference on leverage between the two groups of firms. 
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firm, single and multiple-segment change firms and multiple-segment no-change firms. The 
results from this testing (not tabulated) continue to provide no evidence that the adoption of 
either accounting standard changed analyst forecast errors or forecast dispersion.
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Furthermore, for the IFRS 8 sample, we estimate models (2) and (3) using only multiple-
segment firms with no-change in reported segments. For these tests, we define the CHANGE 
variable as an indicator variable equal to one if the firm reduced one of the line item 
disclosures after adopting IFRS 8. We continue to find no evidence that the adoption of IFRS 
8 changes the properties of analyst forecasts.
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Overall, our results do not support an association between the new approach to segment 
identification and the properties of analysts’ forecasts in Australia. Leung and Verriest (2014) 
reach a similar conclusion for their analysis of the change in geographic segment information 
after the adoption of IFRS 8. One possible interpretation for these findings is that the new 
information revealed upon the adoption of the standards was already available from other 
sources. Alternatively, as many firms in our original sample do not have analyst coverage, 
our sample size to test models (2) and (3) was significantly reduced. This smaller sample size 
perhaps limits our ability to find a significant effect on the properties of analyst forecasts 
around the adoption of the new accounting standards. For instance, it is possible that the 
effect of the new standards on a firm’s information environment is greater in firms without 
analyst following. 
We also examine whether the adoption of IAS 14R or IFRS 8 resulted in an increase in 
analyst following for firms which reported additional segments. To conduct these tests we 
calculated analyst following one year before and one year after the adoption of each standard. 
We then compare whether the change in analyst following differs depending on whether the 
firm reports additional segments when the each standard is first adopted. This univariate 
comparison (not tabulated) reveals no significant difference in the increase in analyst 
following between the two groups of firms. We also estimate a regression for each 
accounting standard adoption with the change in analyst following around the adoption of 
each standard as the dependent variable. The independent variables include: an indicator 
variable denoting firms with an increase in the number of reported segments (CHANGE), 
return on assets, firm size, the number of analysts following the firm in the year prior to the 
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 We also alternatively define the CHANGE variable as a count of the number of disclosures that were no 
longer provided after the adoption of IFRS 8. The results on the POST and CHANGE variable and the 
interaction remain insignificant. 
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adoption of each standard and an indicator variable denoting firms making a loss. The 
findings from this regression (not tabulated) provide an insignificant coefficient on CHANGE 
suggesting that the change in analyst following is not associated with the disclosure of 
additional segments. The results on the other variables indicate that the change in analyst 




5.5 Additional analysis 
Was there under-reporting prior to the adoption of IAS 14R and IFRS 8? 
An assumption which underpins our study is that prior to the adoption of IAS 14R and IFRS 
8 firms under-reported segments for external reporting purposes. The amendments in IAS 
14R and IFRS 8 which moved firms towards a management approach for segment reporting 
suggests that standard setters also perceived that at least some firms were under-reporting 
their segments. Without access to internal firm documents it is very difficult to assess 
whether or not firms are accurately disclosing their segment information.  
To at least partially address this issue we follow the approach of Street et al. (2002) and 
Nichols et al. (2012) and manually compare the segment information in the financial 
statements footnote disclosure with the firm organisational structure described in the other 
parts of the annual report. Each observation is then coded as being consistent, inconsistent or 
not applicable if no information on organisational structure was disclosed in the other parts of 
the annual report.
36
 To limit manual data collection requirements this analysis was conducted 
for the largest 150 firms (as measured by total assets) for the year of adoption of IFRS 8 and 
IAS 14R. We also conducted the analysis for the same set of firms for the year prior to the 
adoption of each standard. The results of this examination are presented in Table 13 
separately for the adoption of IFRS 8 (Panel A) and IAS 14R (Panel B). 
INSERT TABLE 13 HERE 
Panel A of Table 13 reveals that 51% of firms reported segment data consistent with the 
annual report information in the year prior to IFRS 8 adoption. This percentage increased to 
67% upon the adoption of IFRS 8. A chi-square test indicates that this increase is significant 
at the 10% level. The results for the adoption of IAS 14R are shown in Panel B and indicate 
an improvement in segment disclosure consistency from 67% in the year before adoption to 
73% in the year of standard adoption. This increase however is not statistically significant. 
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 This approach is subject to the limitation that it assumes the narrative disclosure in the annual report reflects 
the actual organisational structure of the firm. 
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Assuming that the narrative disclosure in the annual report reflects the actual organisational 
structure of the firm, the findings in Table 13 suggest that many firms presented segment 
information inconsistent with their internal reporting structure. This result provides a level of 
assurance that some firms under-report their segment information and this supports the move 
by standard setters to attempt to align internal and external reporting. We leave it to 
subsequent research to further investigate the under-reporting of segment information 
possibly through the use of alternative techniques. 
Over-reporting of segments 
The data in Table 2 indicate that upon the adoption of IFRS 8/(IAS 14R), 41/(31) firms 
moved from being multiple-segment firms to single-segment firms. Although a detailed 
investigation of these firms is beyond the scope of this study, we undertake some preliminary 
analysis on how these firms differ to both single and multiple-segment no-change firms. This 
analysis involved a univariate comparison of means and medians for each of the independent 
variables included in regression model (1).
37
 In the interests of brevity, we do not tabulate 
these results. The main findings from this analysis are that firms which over-reported the 
number of segments: had significantly higher ownership concentration, were less likely to 
have an NCI stake in the group, were larger in size and had more subsidiaries. It is surprising 
that these firms had a higher ownership concentration and the absence of an outside equity 
interest, as evidence from previous Australian studies suggests that these factors lead to lower 
and not higher disclosure (McKinnon and Dalimunthe, 1993 and Mitchell et al., 1995). As 
these over-reporting firms were larger and had more subsidiaries, a possible interpretation for 
their greater disclosure is that the firms chose to provide additional information due to the 
breadth and scope of their activities. The number of loss making segments, industry diversity 
and ownership concentration were generally insignificantly different between the over-
reporting firms and both single and multiple-segment no-change firms. The only exception is 
that firms which over-reported the number of segments prior to the adoption of IFRS 8 had 
higher mean and median sales concentration compared to the single-segment no-change 
group. This is suggestive of these firms over-reporting their segments to make it more 
difficult for competitors and perhaps regulators to assess their revenues and profitability in 
their dominant industry. 
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Segment reporting is considered important in the prediction of future firm profitability. To 
improve the usefulness of segment disclosures, accounting standard setters have mandated 
the management approach based on which firms report their segments externally on a similar 
basis to their internal reporting structure. This study examines the impact on Australian listed 
firms of adopting the management approach for segment reporting. This analysis involves an 
examination of the effect of the adoption of both IAS 14R in 2002 and IFRS 8 in 2009. Our 
results indicate that the adoption of both standards results in an upward change in the number 
of segments disclosed. Our results suggest that a number of factors explains this increase. For 
instance, consistent with an agency explanation, the proportion of loss making segments in a 
firm is positively associated with an increase in the segments disclosed at the time of the 
adoption of IFRS 8. Interestingly, around the adoption of IAS 14R, we document that firms 
which reveal additional segments report less loss-making segments, suggestive of the use of 
the “risks and returns” qualification to avoid reporting segments operating at a loss. We find 
only minimal evidence that industry competitiveness, as measured by our concentration ratio, 
and higher firm profitability are related to the change in the number of reported segments. 
Greater segment industry diversity is related to an increase in the number of segments, 
although this finding is not consistent across our tests. We also investigate whether the 
adoption of IAS 14R and IFRS 8 resulted in lower analyst forecast errors or dispersion. Our 
results suggest that neither standard improved the properties of analyst forecasts. However, 
given that these results are based on a relatively small sample of firms, they need to be 
interpreted with caution. 
We also examine whether multiple-segment firms that did not change the number of their 
reported segments exploit the flexibility in IFRS 8 to reduce the extent of per-segment 
disclosures. Our results show a reduction in the number of line items disclosed under IFRS 8. 
The extent of the reduction in disclosure is negatively associated with the existence of loss-
making segments and is higher for firms operating in more concentrated industries. These 
findings are consistent with a proprietary and political cost explanation.  
A firm’s segment disclosures are expected to reflect a cost-benefit analysis of providing 
transparent segment information consistent with the internal reporting structure of the firm. 
Our analysis investigates whether segments which are newly disclosed upon the adoption of 
IFRS 8 and IAS 14R reflect agency, proprietary and other costs of providing this information. 
Informed by prior research on voluntary segment reporting this examination attempts to 
include controls which reflect demand-side factors for segment information. To the extent 
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that these variables do not fully capture the demand for segment information, our results may 
be an artefact of the research method employed. 
This study adds to the body of evidence on the impact of the management approach to 
segment reporting outside the US. We recommend that further research be conducted in other 
countries to determine the motivations for the non-disclosure of segments prior to the use of 
the management approach. In particular, we find little evidence to support the proprietary 
cost explanation for the non-disclosure of segments. Future research can further examine this 
finding perhaps through the use of alternative or more sophisticated measures for the 
proprietary costs of segment disclosure. Also, the influence of political costs on segment 
disclosure is largely unexamined and warrants further research. In addition, our results for 
analyst forecasts do not support an association between the management approach and 
analysts’ information environment in Australia. We leave it to future studies to examine this 
result in more detail perhaps using a longer time series of data or using alternative measures 
to test whether segment reporting improves  firms’ information environment. Furthermore, 
future research can examine more comprehensively whether firm segment disclosures 
complied with the detailed requirements of the new accounting standards. Subsequent 
research can also consider whether there is a relationship between a firm’s segment and other 
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Figure 1: Key disclosure differences between IAS 14R and IFRS 8. 
 IAS 14R IFRS 8 
Profit/Loss Y Y 
Assets Y Y 
Liabilities Y N* 
Depreciation Y N* 
Revenue Y N* 
Capital Expenditure Y N* 





Table 1: Distribution (frequency) of single-segment firms and multiple-segment firms in 
the lag adoption year 
 
Panel A     










Total number of 
firms 
single-segment  1,007 
 (84.1%) 
 190 
  (15.9%) 
 1,197 
 (100%) 
multi-segment  41  379  420 
Total number of firms  1,048  569  1,617 
Panel B     









Total number of 
firms 
 
single-segment  568 





 multi-segment  21  523  544 





Table 2: Number of reported segments and reporting change in the number of segments in the 
lag adoption year 
Panel A: Number of reported segments: IAS14R vs. IFRS 8 
 
IAS 14R IFRS 8 
No. of 
segments 








1 1,197 74.0 1,197 74.0% 1,048 64.8% 1,048 64.8% 
2 236 14.6 1,433 88.6% 294 18.2% 1,342 83.0% 
3 92 5.7 1,525 94.3% 133 8.2% 1,475 91.2% 
4 55 3.4 1,580 97.7% 74 4.6% 1,549 95.8% 
5 28 1.7 1,608 99.4% 44 2.7% 1,593 98.5% 
6 5 0.3 1,613 99.8% 11 0.7% 1,604 99.2% 
7 1 0.1 1,614 99.8% 6 0.4% 1,610 99.6% 
8 1 0.1 1,615 99.9% 3 0.2% 1,613 99.8% 
9 2 0.1 1,617 100.0% 2 0.1% 1,615 99.9% 
10 0    1 0.1% 1,616 99.9% 
11 0    1 0.1% 1,617 100.0% 
 
Panel B: Change in number of segments under IFRS 8 
Change in no. of 
segments 




-3 1 0.06% 1 0.06% 
-2 8 0.49% 9 0.56% 
-1 53 3.28% 62 3.83% 
0 1,285 79.47% 1,347 83.30% 
+1 181 11.19% 1,528 94.50% 
+2 52 3.22% 1,580 97.71% 
+3 20 1.24% 1,600 98.95% 
+4 10 0.62% 1,610 99.57% 
+5 5 0.31% 1,615 99.88% 
+6 1 0.06% 1,616 99.94% 
+10 1 0.06% 1,617 100.00% 
 
Panel C: Change in number of segments under IFRS 8 classified by number of segments under IAS 14R 
   Change in the number of reported segments under IFRS 8 
  No. 
of 
























1 1,197    1,007 130 37 11 7 3 1 1 
2 236   34 154 32 9 6 1    
3 92  6 8 59 10 5 1 2 1   
4 55 1 2 5 39 6  2     
5 28   5 19 2 1   1   
6 5   1 4        
7 1     1       
8 1    1        




Panel D: Number of reported segments: IAS 14 vs. IAS 14R 
 IAS 14 IAS 14R 
No. of 
segments 








1 697 56.2% 697 56.2% 598 48.2% 598 48.2% 
2 224 18.0% 921 74.2% 246 19.8% 844 68.0% 
3 168 1.5% 1,089 87.8% 208 16.8% 1,052 84.8% 
4 88 7.1% 1,177 94.9% 111 8.9% 1,163 93.7% 
5 36 2.9% 1,213 97.7% 39 3.1% 1,202 96.9% 
6 19 1.5% 1,232 99.3% 24 1.9% 1,226 98.8% 
7 7 0.6% 1,239 99.8% 10 0.8% 1,236 99.6% 
8 1 0.1% 1,240 99.9% 3 0.2% 1,239 99.8% 
9 0  1,240 99.9 1 0.1% 1,240 99.9% 
10 0  1,240 99.9 0  1,240 99.9% 
11 0  1,240 99.9 1 0.1% 1,241 100% 
12 1 0.1% 1,241 100%     
 
Panel E: Change in number of segments under IAS 14R 
Change in no. of 
segments 




 -3 4 0.32% 4 0.32% 
 -2 22 1.77% 26 2.10% 
 -1 55 4.43% 81 6.53% 
 0 954 76.87% 1,035 83.40% 
 +1 113 9.11% 1,148 92.51% 
 +2 59 4.75% 1,207 97.26% 
 +3 22 1.77% 1,229 99.03% 
 +4 7 0.56% 1,236 99.60% 
 +5 3 0.24% 1,239 99.84% 
 +6 2 0.16% 1,241 100.00% 
 
Panel F: Change in number of segments under IAS 14R classified by number of segments under IAS 14 
   Change in the number of reported segments under IAS 14R 
  No. 
of 























1 697    568 60 42 17 6 2 2 
2 224   21 167 22 11 3    
3 168  9 13 125 16 4   1  
4 88 1 5 14 59 4 2 2 1   
5 36 1 3 5 19 8      
6 19 2 2 3 11 1      
7 7   1 5 1      
8 1     1      
11 1   1        
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Table 3: Univariate tests between samples 
Panel A: Single to Multiple-segment (1) vs. Single-segment no-change (0) 
IFRS 8 Single to 
multiple- 
segment
s = 1 






DIVERSITY 1 188 1 3 0.324 1.079 n/a 1 n/a 
 0 0 n/a n/a n/a n/a  n/a  
CONCEN 1 185 0.455 0.999 0.160 0.653 0.74 0.626 1.00 
 0 941 0.486 0.975 0.194 0.633  0.626  
NLSEG 1 186 0 1 0.403 0.424 n/a 0.500 n/a 
 0 942 n/a n/a n/a n/a  n/a  
MTB 1 186 -10.918 37.804 3.562 2.040 0.342 1.278 0.025** 
 0 948 -517.01 145.02 19.70 1.337  0.952  
ROA 1 189 -7.925 0.975 0.748 -0.21 0.136 -0.047 0.00** 
 0 906 -162.42 59.686 7.687 -0.98  -0.154  
LEVERAGE 1 188 -10.838 17.953 2.165 0.920 0.03** 0.331 0.00** 
 0 972 -58.598 50.378 4.307 0.452  0.920  
SIZE 1 189 5.286 10.344 0.469 7.588 0.00*** 7.552 0.00** 
 0 981 3.622 9.991 1.412 6.940  7.001  
NCI 1 186 0 1 0.447 0.272 0.00*** 0 n/a 
 0 921 0 1 0.055 0.298  0  
TOP20 1 188 0.100 0.990 0.199 0.637 0.001*** 0.652 0.001*** 
 0 1,002 0.098 0.994 0.198 0.592  0.598  
SUBSNUM 1 189 0 300 0.119 29.286 0.00*** 5 0.00*** 
 0 1,003 0 100 0.101 8.470  3  
IAS 14R          
DIVERSITY 1 129 1 3 0.453 1.171 n/a 1 n/a 
 0 0 n/a n/a n/a n/a  n/a  
CONCEN 1 129 0.457 0.960 0.179 0.604 0.676 0.524 0.6141 
 0 568 0.457 0.960 0.159 0.597  0.524  
NLSEG 1 129 0 1 0.070 0.012 n/a 0.000 n/a 
 0 568 n/a n/a n/a n/a  n/a  
MTB 1 129 -0.045 105.14 9.583 2.985 0.399 1.300 0.683 
 0 568 -128.72 84.700 9.896 2.176  1.243  
ROA 1 129 -2.370 0.248 0.404 -0.128 0.347 0.025 0.00*** 
 0 568 -48.047 35.500 2.780 -0.359  -0.050  
LEVERAGE 1 129 -1.135 16.300 2.035 1.216 0.517 0.596 0.00*** 
 0 568 -77.677 61.374 5.501 0.897  0.272  
SIZE 1 129 12.937 23.250 2.045 17.65 0.00*** 17.480 0.00*** 
 0 568 9.082 24.370 2.124 16.72  16.389  
NCI 1 129 0 1 0.371 0.163 0117 0 0155 
 0 568 0 1 0.316 0.113  0  
TOP20 1 129 0.176 0.981 0.182 0.665 0.074* 0.684 0.235 
 0 568 0 0.996 0.212 0.629  0.656  
SUBSNUM 1 129 0 138 23.338 13.03 0.00*** 5 0.00*** 
 0 568 0 154 11.705 5.234  2  
*** Significant at the 0.01 level (2- tailed) 
** Significant at the 0.05 level (2- tailed) 
* Significant at the 0.10 level (2- tailed) 
Variables are: 
DIVERSITY:  number of unique second level GICS (Global Industry Classification Standard) industries  
(n=24) in which a firm operates 
CONCEN:  top four firms’ sales in a firm’s primary GICS industry divided by the sum of all the firms’ 
sales in that industry 
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NLSEG:  the number of segments reporting losses after the adoption of IFRS 8 or IAS 14R 
divided by the  total number of segments post IFRS 8 or IAS 14R 
MTB:  market-to-book ratio 
ROA:  return on assets 
LEVERAGE total debt divided by total equity 
SIZE:   firm size calculated as the log of total assets,  
NCI:   indicator variable coded as 1 for the existence of a non-controlling interest, 0 otherwise 
TOP20:   percentage ownership of the top 20 shareholders  
SUBSNUM:  the number of subsidiaries
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Panel B: Single to Multiple-segment (1) vs. Multiple-segment no-change (0) 










DIVERSITY 1 188 1 3 0.324 1.073 0.000*** 1 0.000*** 
 0 276 1 6 0.847 1.263  1  
CONCEN 1 185 0.455 0.999 0.160 0.653 0.595 0.626 0.116 
 0 272 0 0.975 0.183 0.643  0.655  
NLSEG 1 186 0 1 0.403 0.424 0.029*** 0.500 0.025** 
 0 277 0 1 0.384 0.306  0.225  
MTB 1 186 -10.918 37.804 3.562 2.040 0.129 1.278 0.000*** 
 0 273 -263.52 41.700 15.706 0.653  0.832  
ROA 1 189 -7.925 0.975 0.748 -0.214 0.892 -0.047 0.000*** 
 0 277 -9.835 0.588 0.978 -0.262  0.004  
LEVERAGE 1 188 -10.838 17.953 2.165 0.920 0.361 0.331 0.000** 
 0 277 -1856.3 43.312 104.135 -4.523  0.748  
SIZE 1 189 5.286 10.344 0.469 7.588 0.000*** 7.552 0.001*** 
 0 277 5.017 11.771 1.046 7.876  7.811  
NCI 1 186 0 1 0.447 0.272 0.001*** 0 n/a 
 0 276 0 1 0.489 0.392  0  
TOP20 1 188 0.100 0.990 0.199 0.637 0.077* 0.652 0.186 
 0 276 0.223 0.997 0.188 0.662  0.671  
SUBSNUM 1 189 0 300 0.119 29.286 0.004** 5 0.159 
 0 272 0 950 67.678 28.508  11  
IAS 14R          
DIVERSITY 1 129 1 3 0.453 1.171 0.132 1 0.184 
 0 386 1 5 0.570 1.254  1  
CONCEN 1 129 0.457 0.960 0.179 0.604 0.388 0.524 0.356 
 0 386 0.457 0.960 0.165 0.589  0.524  
NLSEG 1 129 0 0.500 0.070 0.012 0.00*** 0.000 0.00*** 
 0 386 0 1 0.389 0.502  0.500  
MTB 1 129 -0.045 105.136 9.583 2.985 0.856 1.300 0.666 
 0 386 -1.700 96.301 7.950 2.832  1.223  
ROA 1 129 -2.370 0.248 0.404 -0.128 0.251 0.025 0.147 
 0 386 -14.381 0.529 0.901 -0.223  -0.007  
LEVERAGE 1 129 -1.135 16.300 2.035 1.216 0.453 0.596 0.559 
 0 386 -10.627 76.955 5.720 1.602 386 0.677  
SIZE 1 129 12.937 23.250 2.045 17.654 0.751 17.480 0.666 
 0 386 12.559 26.163 2.267 17.725  17.230  
NCI 1 129 0 1 0.371 0.163 0.00*** 0 0.00*** 
 0 386 0 1 0.463 0.311  0  
TOP20 1 129 0.176 0.981 0.182 0.665 0.072* 0.684 0.666 
 0 386 0 0.999 0.231 0.624  0.665  
SUBSNUM 1 129 0 138 23.338 13.031 0.312 5 0.297 
 0 386 0 895 59.400 18.461  6  
*** Significant at the 0.01 level (2- tailed) 
** Significant at the 0.05 level (2- tailed) 






DIVERSITY:  number of unique second level GICS (Global Industry Classification Standard) industries  
(n=24) in which a firm operates 
CONCEN:  top four firms’ sales in a firm’s primary GICS industry divided by the sum of all the firms’ 
sales in that industry 
NLSEG:  the number of segments reporting losses after the adoption of IFRS 8 or IAS 14R 
divided by the total number of segments post IFRS 8 or IAS 14R 
MTB:  market-to-book ratio 
ROA:  return on assets 
LEVERAGE total debt divided by total equity 
SIZE:   firm size calculated as the log of total assets 
NCI:   indicator variable coded as 1 for the existence of a non-controlling interest, 0 otherwise 
TOP20:   percentage ownership of the top 20 shareholders  
SUBSNUM:  the number of subsidiaries
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Panel C: Multiple-Segment Increase (1) vs. Multiple-segment no-change (0) 










DIVERSITY 1 80 1 4 0.837 1.588 0.187 1 0.699 
 0 276 1 6 0.847 1.263  1  
CONCEN 1 77 0 0.980 0.216 0.650 0.694 0.660 0.517 
 0 272 0 0.975 0.183 0.643  0.655  
NLSEG 1 80 0 0.800 0.263 0.237 0.013** 0.230 0.176 
 0 277 0 1 0.384 0.306  0.225  
MTB 1 77 -2.48 13.250 2.558 1.995 0.138 1.000 0.028** 
 0 273 -263.52 41.700 15.706 0.653  0.832  
ROA 1 80 -1.810 0.300 0.313 -0.021 0.039** 0.050 0.194 
 0 277 -9.835 0.588 0.978 -0.262  0.004  
LEVERAGE 1 79 -46.30 39.98 7.561 1.482 0.322 0.750 0.524 
 0 277 -1856.33 43.312 104.135 -4.523  0.748  
SIZE 1 80 6.460 11.640 1.146 8.586 0.000*** 8.670 0.039** 
 0 277 5.017 11.771 1.046 7.876  7.811  
NCI 1 78 0 0 0.502 0.538 0.446 0 n/a 
 0 276 0 1 0.489 0.392  0  
TOP20 1 80 0.32 0.92 0.154 0.685 0.733 0.700 1 
 0 276 0.223 0.997 0.188 0.662  0.671  
SUBSNUM 1 79 0 276 53.814 41.575 0.560 18.5 0.458 
 0 272 0 950 67.678 28.508  11  
IAS 14R          
DIVERSITY 1 77 1 7 0.896 1.442 0.018** 1 0.066* 
 0 386 1 5 0.570 1.254  1  
CONCEN 1 77 0.458 0.960 0.165 0.584 0.799 0.484 0.845 
 0 386 0.457 0.960 0.165 0.589  0.524  
NLSEG 1 77 0 0.750 0.237 0.204 0.00*** 0.143 0.00*** 
 0 386 0 1 0.389 0.502  0.500  
MTB 1 77 0.094 8.494 1.670 2.018 0.372 1.470 0.023** 
 0 386 -1.700 96.301 7.950 2.832  1.223  
ROA 1 77 -4.083 0.145 0.578 -0.110 0.293 0.046 0.00** 
 0 386 -14.381 0.529 0.901 -0.223  -0.007  
LEVERAGE 1 77 0.011 18.562 3.590 2.209 0.371 1.280 0.00*** 
 0 386 -10.627 76.955 5.720 1.602  0.677  
SIZE 1 77 14.753 25.969 2.656 19.616 0.00*** 19.438 0.00 
 0 386 12.559 26.163 2.267 17.725  17.230  
NCI 1 77 0 1.000 0.501 0.455 0.015** 0 0.021** 
 0 386 0 1.000 0.463 0.311  0  
TOP20 1 77 0.207 0.997 0.169 0.631 0.808 0.641 0.467 
 0 386 0 0.999 0.231 0.624  0.665  
SUBSNUM 1 77 0 423 72.552 43.597 0.00*** 17 0.00*** 
 0 386 0 895 59.400 18.461  6  
*** Significant at the 0.01 level (2- tailed) 
** Significant at the 0.05 level (2- tailed) 






DIVERSITY:  number of unique second level GICS (Global Industry Classification Standard) industries  
(n=24) in which a firm operates 
CONCEN:  top four firms’ sales in a firm’s primary GICS industry divided by the sum of all the firms’ 
sales in that industry 
NLSEG:  the number of segments reporting losses after the adoption of IFRS 8 or IAS 14R 
divided by the total number of segments post IFRS 8 or IAS 14R 
MTB:  market-to-book ratio 
ROA:  return on assets 
LEVERAGE total debt divided by total equity 
SIZE:   firm size calculated as the log of total assets 
NCI:   indicator variable coded as 1 for the existence of a non-controlling interest, 0 otherwise 
TOP20:   percentage ownership of the top 20 shareholders  
SUBSNUM:  the number of subsidiaries
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Table 4: Pearson correlation matrix 
Panel A 
IFRS 8 
DIVERSITY CONCEN NLSEG MTB ROA LEVERAGE SIZE NCI TOP20 SUBSNUM 
DIVERSITY 1          
CONCEN 0.026 1         
NLSEG 0.493*** 0.032 1        
MTB -0.011 0.014 -0.021 1       
ROA 0.051** -0.031 0.018 -0.009 1      
LEVERAGE -0.041 -0.028 -0.076*** 0.415*** 0.001 1     
SIZE 0.307*** -0.074*** 0.056** 0.033 0.128*** 0.019 1    
NCI 0.524*** 0.018 0.322*** -0.014 0.037 -0.054** 0.276*** 1   
TOP20 0.148*** -0.046* 0.055** -0.007 0.025 -0.028 0.084*** 0.112*** 1  
SUBSNUM 0.352*** -0.076*** 0.212 0.003 0.027 0.014 0.343*** 0.335*** 0.090*** 1 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level (2- tailed); ** Significant at the 0.05 level (2- tailed); * Significant at the 0.10 level (2- tailed) 
Variables are: 
DIVERSITY:  number of unique second level GICS (Global Industry Classification Standard) industries (n=24) in which a firm operates 
CONCEN:  top four firms’ sales in a firm’s primary GICS industry divided by the sum of all the firms’ sales in that industry 
NLSEG:  the number of segments reporting losses after the adoption of IFRS 8 or IAS 14R divided by the total number of segments post IFRS 8 or IAS 14R  
MTB:  market-to-book ratio 
ROA:  return on assets 
LEVERAGE total debt divided by total equity 
SIZE:   firm size calculated as the log of total assets 
NCI:   indicator variable coded as 1 for the existence of a non-controlling interest, 0 otherwise 
TOP20:   percentage ownership of the top 20 shareholders  
SUBSNUM:  the number of subsidiaries 
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Table 4: continued 
Panel B 
IAS 14R 
DIVERSITY CONCEN NLSEG MTB ROA LEVERAGE SIZE NCI TOP20 SUBSNUM 
DIVERSITY 1          
CONCEN 0.005 1         
NLSEG -0.072** 0.093*** 1        
MTB 0.066** -0.012 0.002 1       
ROA -0.028 -0.008 -0.173*** -0.011 1      
LEVERAGE 0.012 -0.069** -0.068** 0.355*** 0.021 1     
SIZE 0.052* -0.022 -0.526*** -0.046 0.194*** 0.126*** 1    
NCI 0.180*** 0.010 -0.075** -0.009 0.012 0.065** 0.267** 1   
TOP20 -0.049* 0.052* -0.083** 0.014 0.047 0.016 -0.025 0.000 1  
SUBSNUM 0.113*** 0.054* -0.164*** -0.009 0.032 0.056* 0.425** 0.277*** 0.032 1 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level (2- tailed); ** Significant at the 0.05 level (2- tailed); * Significant at the 0.10 level (2- tailed) 
 
Variables are: 
DIVERSITY:  number of unique second level GICS (Global Industry Classification Standard) industries (n=24) in which a firm operates 
CONCEN:  top four firms’ sales in a firm’s primary GICS industry divided by the sum of all the firms’ sales in that industry 
NLSEG:  the number of segments reporting losses after the adoption of IFRS 8 or IAS 14R divided by the total number of segments post IFRS 8 or IAS 14R 
MTB:  market-to-book ratio 
ROA:  return on assets 
LEVERAGE total debt divided by total equity 
SIZE:   firm size calculated as the log of total assets 
 NCI:   indicator variable coded as 1 for the existence of a non-controlling interest, 0 otherwise 
TOP20:   percentage ownership of the top 20 shareholders 
SUBSNUM:  the number of subsidiaries 
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Table 5: Logit regression testing which firms disclosed additional segments after the accounting 
standard 









































































































































N 1,198 510 399 1,597 590 
Pseudo R
2 
0.213 0.071 0.085 0.264 0.025 
Wald Chi-sq 103.00*** 42.56*** 35.31*** 278.31*** 21.57*** 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level (2- tailed),  
** Significant at the 0.05 level (2- tailed),  
* Significant at the 0.10 level (2- tailed) 
Variables are: 
DIVERSITY:  number of unique second level GICS (Global Industry Classification Standard) industries  
(n=24) in which a firm operates 
CONCEN:  top four firms’ sales in a firm’s primary GICS industry divided by the sum of all the firms’ 
sales in that industry 
NLSEG:  the number of segments reporting losses after the adoption of IFRS 8 or IAS 14R 
divided by the total number of segments post IFRS 8 or IAS 14R 
MTB:  market-to-book ratio 
ROA:  return on assets 
LEVERAGE total debt divided by total equity 
SIZE:   firm size calculated as the log of total assets 
NCI:   indicator variable coded as 1 for the existence of a non-controlling interest, 0 otherwise 
TOP20:   percentage ownership of the top 20 shareholders  
SUBSNUM:          the number of subsidiaries 
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N 698 516 464 1,161 593 
Pseudo R
2 
0.050 0.451 0.150 0.246 0.269 
Wald Chi-sq 25.58*** 68.53*** 55.56*** 180.29*** 120.73*** 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level (2- tailed),  
** Significant at the 0.05 level (2- tailed),  
* Significant at the 0.10 level (2- tailed) 
Variables are: 
DIVERSITY:  number of unique second level GICS (Global Industry Classification Standard) industries  
(n=24) in which a firm operates 
CONCEN:  top four firms’ sales in a firm’s primary GICS industry divided by the sum of all the firms’ sales 
in that industry 
NLSEG:  the number of segments reporting losses after the adoption of IFRS 8 or IAS 14R 
divided by the total number of segments post IFRS 8 or IAS 14R 
MTB:  market-to-book ratio 
ROA:  return on assets 
LEVERAGE total debt divided by total equity 
SIZE:   firm size calculated as the log of total assets 
NCI:   indicator variable coded as 1 for the existence of a non-controlling interest, 0 otherwise 
TOP20:   percentage ownership of the top 20 shareholders  
SUBSNUM:          the number of subsidiaries 
testing which firms disclosed additional segments after the accounting standard 
Single to Multi- 








 Single and Multi 
changer vs. Single and 
Multi non- changer 
(4) 
 Single and Multi 
changer vs. Multi-
segment non- changer 
(5) 
 

















































































































































































0.081  0.086  0.225  0.036  
43.19***  50.55***  322.34***  33.19***  
** Significant at the 0.05 level, * Significant at the 0.10 level. All 2-tailed. 




DIVERSITY:  number of unique second level GICS (Global Industry Classification Standard) industries (n=24) in which a firm operates 
CONCEN:  top four firms’ sales in a firm’s primary GICS industry divided by the sum of all the firms’ sales in that industry 
NLSEG:  the number of segments reporting losses after the adoption of IFRS 8 or IAS 14R divided by the total number of segments post IFRS 8 or IAS 14R 
MTB:  market-to-book ratio 
ROA:  return on assets 
LEVERAGE total debt divided by total equity 
SIZE:   firm size calculated as the log of total assets 
NCI:   indicator variable coded as 1 for the existence of a non-controlling interest, 0 otherwise 
TOP20:   percentage ownership of the top 20 shareholders 





Table 6: continued 
Panel B: 
IAS 14R 
Single to Multi-segment 
changer vs. Single- 
Segment non-changer 
(1) 
 Single to Multi- 








 Single and Multi 
changer vs. Single and 
Multi non- changer 
(4) 
 Single and Multi 
changer vs. Multi-
segment non- changer 
(5) 
 





















































































































































































































Pseudo R2 0.057  0.391  0.146  0.210  0.221  
Wald Chi-sq 45.28***  91.61***  74.82***  180.21***  142.02***  
*** Significant at the 0.01 level, ** Significant at the 0.05 level, * Significant at the 0.10 level. All 2-tailed. 
Categories in the regression are: 




DIVERSITY:  number of unique second level GICS (Global Industry Classification Standard) industries (n=24) in which a firm operates 
CONCEN:  top four firms’ sales in a firm’s primary GICS industry divided by the sum of all the firms’ sales in that industry 
NLSEG:  the number of segments reporting losses after the adoption of IFRS 8 or IAS 14Rdivided by the total number of segments post IFRS 8 or IAS 14R 
MTB:  market-to-book ratio 
ROA:  return on assets 
LEVERAGE total debt divided by total equity 
SIZE:   firm size calculated as the log of total assets 
NCI:   indicator variable coded as 1 for the existence of a non-controlling interest, 0 otherwise 
TOP20:   percentage ownership of the top 20 shareholders 
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Table 7: Comparison of disclosures made by multiple-segment firms with no-change in the 






Segment Assets 277 244 
Segment Liabilities 277 218 
Segment Revenue 277 274 
Segment Capital Expenditure 277 160 
Segment Result 277 277 





Table 8: Analysis of disclosure changes for multiple-segment firms with no-change in the 

































Dummy = 1 





































































































































































N 277 277 277 277 277 277 277 
McFadden R2 0.090 0.085 0.106 0.214 0.017 0.027 - 
Likelihood 
Test 
17.20*** 23.47*** 39.58*** 8.03 19.89*** 20.15*** - 
% Predicted 
Correctly 
59.12 88.32 78.10 98.91 0.6168 73.36 - 
Pseudo R2 - - - - - - 0.042 
Wald chi-
square 
- - - - - - 30.28*** 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level (2- tailed),  
** Significant at the 0.05 level (2- tailed),  
* Significant at the 0.10 level (2- tailed) 
 
Variables are: 
DIVERSITY:  number of unique second level GICS (Global Industry Classification Standard) industries  
(n=24) in which a firm operates 
CONCEN:  top four firms’ sales in a firm’s primary GICS industry divided by the sum of all the firms’ 
sales in that industry 
NLSEG:  the number of segments reporting losses after the adoption of IFRS 8 or IAS 14R divided by 
the total number of segments post IFRS 8 or IAS 14R 
MTB:  market-to-book ratio 
ROA:  return on assets 
LEVERAGE total debt divided by total equity 
SIZE:   firm size calculated as the log of total assets 
NCI:   indicator variable coded as 1 for the existence of a non-controlling interest, 0 otherwise 
TOP20:   percentage ownership of the top 20 shareholders  
SUBSNUM:          the number of subsidiaries
59 
 
Table 9: Descriptive statistics on analyst forecast errors 
Panel A: Earnings forecast 
errors 
IFRS 8 
(n = 440)   
IAS 14R 
(n = 377) 
 
 Mean Median St Dev Mean Median St Dev 
AFE 2.4362 0.0300 44.2626 1.5684 0.0359 17.6711 
POST 0.5045 1.0000 0.5005 0.5093 1.0000 0.5006 
CHANGE 0.2727 0.0000 0.4459 0.3793 0.0000 0.4859 
SIZE 19.9052 19.7241 1.6141 19.7161 19.4653 1.8148 
AFOLLOW 6.5136 5.0000 4.7789 6.4615 6.0000 4.1991 
MTIMELY 268.3914 267.1667 22.7923 268.5089 271.0000 29.4767 
D_LOSS 0.1909 0.0000 0.3935 0.1698 0.0000 0.3759 
Panel B: Cash flow forecast 
errors 
IFRS 8 
(n = 449)   
IAS 14R 
(n = 384) 
 
 Mean Median St Dev Mean Median St Dev 
AFE 2.3896 0.0302 43.8170 1.5423 0.0361 17.5100 
POST 0.5056 1.0000 0.5005 0.5078 1.0000 0.5006 
CHANGE 0.2762 0.0000 0.4476 0.3802 0.0000 0.4861 
SIZE 19.9195 19.7450 1.6104 19.7206 19.4659 1.8148 
AFOLLOW 6.4588 5.0000 4.7555 6.4349 6.0000 4.1745 
MTIMELY 267.6154 267.1667 23.5958 267.8796 270.9167 31.8011 
D_LOSS 0.1871 0.0000 0.3904 0.1667 0.0000 0.3732 
Variables are: 
AFE:  Absolute forecast error relating to the upcoming financial year earnings (operating cash 
flow), calculated as the average absolute forecast error of forecasts issued during the 180 
days following the previous financial year’s announcement date 
POST:  indicator variable coded as one for observations after the change in accounting standard 
CHANGE:  indicator variable coded as one for firms with an increase in the number of segments after 
the change in accounting standard 
SIZE: natural logarithm of the market value of the firm for the financial year end being forecast 
AFOLLOW: the maximum number of analysts following a firm during the 180 day window  
MTIMELY: average number of days between the analyst forecast and the announcement date of the 
number being forecast 
D_LOSS: indicator variable coded as one for observations where the earnings or cash flow for the 




Table 10: Descriptive statistics on analyst forecast dispersion 
Panel A: Earnings forecast 
dispersion 
IFRS 8 
(n = 418)   
IAS 14R 
(n = 343) 
 
 Mean Median St Dev Mean Median St Dev 
AFD 0.0534 0.0206 0.2245 0.0388 0.0153 0.0824 
POST 0.5000 0.5000 0.5006 0.5102 1.0000 0.5006 
CHANGE 0.2775 0.0000 0.4483 0.3790 0.0000 0.4858 
SIZE 20.0052 19.8188 1.5740 19.8780 19.6861 1.8032 
AFOLLOW 6.7990 5.0000 4.7335 6.8921 6.0000 4.1057 
MTIMELY 269.0335 267.5000 21.2204 269.4276 270.8333 26.3929 
D_LOSS 0.1866 0.0000 0.3901 0.1429 0.0000 0.3504 
Panel B: Cash flow forecast 
dispersion 
IFRS 8 
(n = 415)   
IAS 14R 
(n = 340) 
 
 Mean Median St Dev Mean Median St Dev 
AFD 0.5789 0.0443 6.8726 0.1232 0.0447 0.4266 
POST 0.5036 1.0000 0.5006 0.5059 1.0000 0.5007 
CHANGE 0.2892 0.0000 0.4539 0.3824 0.0000 0.4867 
SIZE 20.0177 19.8393 1.6008 19.9230 19.7593 1.7892 
AFOLLOW 6.8627 5.0000 4.7184 6.9588 6.0000 4.0576 
MTIMELY 268.8153 267.1667 17.4213 268.6302 270.7500 27.6713 
D_LOSS 0.1711 0.0000 0.3770 0.1412 0.0000 0.3487 
Variables are: 
AFD: Analyst forecast dispersion relating to the upcoming financial year-end earnings (operating 
cash flow), calculated as the standard deviation of all analyst earnings (cash flow) forecasts 
issued during the 180 days following the previous financial year’s announcement date  
POST:  indicator variable coded as one for observations after the change in accounting standard 
CHANGE:  indicator variable coded as one for firms with an increase in the number of segments after 
the change in accounting standard 
SIZE: natural logarithm of the market value of the firm for the financial year end being forecast 
AFOLLOW: the maximum number of analysts following a firm during the 180 day window  
MTIMELY: average number of days between the analyst forecast and the announcement date of the 
number being forecast 
D_LOSS: indicator variable coded as one for observations where the earnings or cash flow for the 
forecast period are less than zero. 
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Table 11: Analyst forecast errors pre- and post- the segment accounting standard change 
 IFRS 8 IAS14R 
 Earnings forecasts Cash flow forecasts Earnings forecasts Cash flow forecasts 
Intercept 100.9512 97.1004 36.2496 35.5162 
 (2.18) (2.17) (2.03) (2.05) 
POST -6.1477 -5.9333 -1.2284 -1.1929 
 (-1.25) (-1.22) (-0.53) (-0.52) 
CHANGE -3.2049 -3.5643 -3.5059 -3.2816 
 (-0.47) (-0.54) (-1.31) (-1.25) 
CHANGE*POST 6.3649 6.2365 5.9457 5.7538 
 (0.67) (0.68) (1.61) (1.58) 
SIZE -5.9090 -5.6102 -2.2892 -2.1733 
 (-2.78)*** (-2.75)*** (-2.60)** (-2.53)** 
AFOLLOW 1.0151 0.9249 0.7171 0.6800 
 (1.38) (1.31) (2.00)** (1.93)* 
MTIMELY 0.0595 0.0546 0.0207 0.0156 
 (0.64) (0.61) (0.68) (0.56) 
D_LOSS -1.9225 -2.1110 5.9705 6.0971 
 (-0.34) (-0.38) (2.19)** (2.26)** 
N 440 449 377 384 
Adjusted R2 0.0107 0.0104 0.0421 0.0411 
F-stat 1.68 1.67 3.36*** 3.34*** 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level (2- tailed),  
** Significant at the 0.05 level (2- tailed),  
* Significant at the 0.10 level (2- tailed) 
Variables are: 
POST:  indicator variable coded as one for observations after the change in accounting standard 
CHANGE:  indicator variable coded as one for firms with an increase in the number of segments after 
the change in accounting standard 
CHANGE*POST: interaction variable between POST and CHANGE 
SIZE: natural logarithm of the market value of the firm for the financial year end being forecast 
AFOLLOW: the maximum number of analysts following a firm during the 180 day window  
MTIMELY: average number of days between the analyst forecast and the announcement date of the 
number being forecast 
D_LOSS: indicator variable coded as one for observations where the earnings or cash flow for the 





Table 12: Analyst forecast dispersion pre- and post- the segment accounting standard change 
 IFRS 8 IAS 14R 
 Earnings forecasts Cash flow forecasts Earnings forecasts Cash flow forecasts 
Intercept 0.0177 1.4562 -0.1769 -0.3828 
 (0.07) (0.18) (-2.03) (-0.83) 
POST -0.0374 -0.3800 0.0022 -0.0178 
 (-1.46) (-0.47) (0.19) (-0.29) 
CHANGE -0.0218 -0.7895 -0.0093 -0.0816 
 (-0.62) (-0.74) (-0.72) (-1.19) 
CHANGE*POST 0.0202 0.2328 0.0083 0.0738 
 (0.41) (0.16) (0.46) (0.77) 
SIZE -0.0168 -0.1519 0.0123 0.0248 
 (-1.50) (-0.45) (2.94)*** (1.13) 
AFOLLOW 0.0048 0.1714 -0.0021 -0.0015 
 (1.25) (1.47) (-1.22) (-0.16) 
MTIMELY 0.0013 0.0052 -0.0001 0.0001 
 (2.53)** (0.26) (-0.53) (0.07) 
D_LOSS 0.0378 -0.0835 0.0715 0.2236 
 (1.27) (-0.09) (5.03)*** (2.98)*** 
N 418 415 343 340 
Adjusted R2 0.0141 -0.0054 0.0555 0.0082 
F-stat 1.85* 0.68 3.87*** 1.40 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level (2- tailed),  
** Significant at the 0.05 level (2- tailed),  
* Significant at the 0.10 level (2- tailed) 
 
Variables are: 
POST:  indicator variable coded as one for observations after the change in accounting standard 
CHANGE:  indicator variable coded as one for firms with an increase in the number of segments after 
the change in accounting standard 
CHANGE*POST: interaction variable between POST and CHANGE 
SIZE: natural logarithm of the market value of the firm for the financial year end being forecast 
AFOLLOW: the maximum number of analysts following a firm during the 180 day window  
MTIMELY: average number of days between the analyst forecast and the announcement date of the 
number being forecast 
D_LOSS: indicator variable coded as one for observations where the earnings or cash flow for the 
forecast period are less than zero 
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Table 13: Comparison of segment disclosure with annual report information 
Panel A: 
IFRS 8 
IFRS 8   IAS 14R   
 Consistent Inconsistent No details Consistent Inconsistent No details 
Number of 
firms 
101 (67%) 48 (32%) 1 (1%) 76 (51%) 74 (49%) 0 (0%) 
Chi-square 2.93*      
Panel B: 
IAS 14R 
IAS 14R   IAS 14   
 Consistent Inconsistent No details Consistent Inconsistent No details 
Number of 
firms 
110 (73%) 33 (22%) 7 (5%) 101 (67%) 39 (26%) 10 (7%) 
Chi-square 1.14      
Observations are coded as consistent/(inconsistent) if the organization structure described in the annual report is 
the same/(different) as the segments disclosed in the financial statements footnote disclosure 
* Significant at the 0.10 level (2- tailed) 
 
